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IN TRODUC T ION
Recent Developments in Cannabis Policy
1. The Americas: a Breakthrough in Conventional Cannabis Policy
In December 2013, Uruguay became the  rst country in the mod-
ern era to legalize cannabis, when president José Alberto “El pepe” 
Mujica signed a law to regulate recreational cannabis. In the United 
States, thirty states and the District of Columbia currently have laws 
broadly legalizing marijuana in some form. Starting with Oregon 
in 1973, individual states began to liberalize cannabis laws through 
decriminalization. In 1996, California was the  rst state to legalize 
medical cannabis, sparking a trend that spread across most other 
US states. In 2012, the vast majority of states allow for limited use 
of medical marijuana under certain circumstances. Some medical 
marijuana laws are broader than others, with types of medical con-
ditions that allow for treatment varying from state to state. In 2013, 
Colorado and Washington became the  rst states to legalize can-
nabis for recreational use. In November 2014, cannabis regulation 
bal lots were approved in the states of Oregon and Alaska. Today, 
eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted the most ex-
pansive laws legalizing marijuana for recreational use. California, 
Nevada, Maine and Massachusetts legalized recreational cannabis 
in 2016 through ballot measure. In Massachusetts, retail sales of 
cannabis are expected to start later this year in July. Voters in Maine 
similarly approved a ballot measure legalizing marijuana in 2016. 
Most recently, sales of recreational-use marijuana in California 
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kicked o  on January 1st, 2018, although the state has not yet ad-
opted rules for licensed marijuana growers or retailers, nor has it 
begun accepting licenses.
In 2013, the Canadian government introduced sweeping legisla-
tion designed to permit the recreational use of marijuana through-
out the country by July 2018, ful lling an election promise by Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau. The bill, inspired in part by the experi-
ences of cannabis regimes in Colorado and Washington state, goes 
well beyond the U.S. situation, where marijuana remains prohibited 
at the federal level. In Canada, the federal government will change 
criminal law nationally and will license growers and set product 
standards while leaving it up to the provinces to handle distribution 
and manage retail sale.
Clearly, a breakthrough in conventional cannabis policy is 
emerging. The current policy trend towards legal regulation of 
the cannabis market is increasingly seen as a more prom ising model 
for protecting people’s health and safety and has changed the drug 
policy landscape and the terms of the debate. The prohibitive model 
has failed to show any sustained impact in reducing the market, 
while imposing heavy burdens upon criminal justice systems; pro-
ducing profoundly negative social and public health impacts; and 
creating criminal markets supporting organized crime, violence 
and corruption.
2. Meanwhile in Europe: Inertia at the National Level versus New Ideas 
Bottom Up 
But while in the Americas cannabis policy reform is taking o , 
European nations seem to be lagging behind, at least at the level 
of national governments who seem to be in denial of the chang-
ing policy landscape. Tom Blickman, a senior project o  cer at 
Transnational Institute (TNI) in Amsterdam, monitors these trends 
meticulously, together with his colleagues: “Cannabis policy reform 
xiii
falls under the remit of European Union member states, not under 
the competence of the European Union (EU). However, European 
law builds on the three UN drug control conventions that oblige 
member states to adopt measures to establish recreational canna-
bis as punishable (penal or administrative) o ences, leaving very 
few options for reform other than non-enforcement of infractions. 
Moreover, EU member states have agreed to cooperate and to take 
the most appropriate measures against cannabis cultivation for 
recreational use.
At the local level, however, disenchantment with the current 
cannabis regime gives rise to new ideas. In several countries in 
Europe, local and regional authorities are looking at regulation, ei-
ther pressured by grassroots movements – in particular the cannabis 
social clubs (CSCs) – or due to the involve ment of criminal groups and 
public disorder.” In the Netherlands, municipalities signed a Joint 
Manifest in which they asked the government to allow for space 
to regulate the supply of co eeshops currently not allowed. In late 
2017, the newly formed coalition announced that they would seek 
to implement an experimental new system in certain cities where 
co eeshops could legally acquire weed from a state-appointed pro-
ducer. In Copenhagen (Denmark), in Mons (Belgium) and in Berlin, 
Frankfurt-am-Main, Hamburg and Cologne (Germany), local au-
thorities promote co eeshop-like dispensaries with a regulated sup-
ply. In Spain and Switzerland, re gional and local authorities want 
to allow cannabis social clubs, while in Belgium, Portugal, France 
and the UK, campaigns for CSCs are gaining momentum.
As in the United States, di erent policies regarding personal use 
and possession for personal use already exist in Europe, from de jure 
decriminalization in Portugal and the Czech Republic to full pro-
hibition in Sweden, as well as intermediate de facto decriminaliza-
tion in countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Germany and Spain. However, to extend this model 
to regulate cultivation practices, is not self-evident. The current 
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legal and political straitjacket in Europe is extremely di  cult to 
reconcile with the request of local authorities to e ectively regulate 
the supply of cannabis for recreational use as an alternative to the 
negative consequences of the current restrictive arrangements. It 
would mean that European states would have to violate the UN 
conventions, just as Uruguay, Canada and the federal U.S. govern-
ment have done. This is not impossible, but will require political 
will to do so.
3. Legalization: a Binary Choice Between Prohibition and 
Commercialization? 
Many of the U.S. states which have legalized cannabis have adopted 
pro t-driven markets which resemble those for alcohol. This is 
despite a considerable public health literature documenting how al-
cohol and tobacco companies maximize pro ts by targeting young 
and heavy users, spend heavily on advertising and promotion to 
normalize use, downplay the health risks of their products, and 
actively lobby regulators and politicians for industry friendly reg-
ulatory environments. Highly pro table alcohol companies simply 
have more money to spend on lobbying politicians and regulators, 
resisting restrictive regulation, and in uencing the public than 
public health groups. There appears to be little reason to believe 
a pro t-driven commercial market for cannabis would be any dif-
ferent. For example, cannabis businesses in Colorado have formed 
the National Cannabis Industry Association (NCIA) (consisting of 
nearly 1,000 cannabis businesses) to promote their interests, and 
cannabis industry representatives are on the working group consid-
ering appropriate regulation of the cannabis sector for the state. In 
another parallel, the cannabis industry’s media has referred to daily 
cannabis users as the “backbone of the industry.” The advertising 
regulations for the cannabis market in Colorado have been mod-
elled on the voluntary code of conduct developed by the alcohol 
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industry, and the Colorado cannabis industry has attempted to 
weaken pesticide regulations for cannabis cultivation.
Jonathan Caulkins, an American drug policy researcher at 
Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, has repeatedly pointed 
out that legalization is often falsely framed as being a binary choice 
between prohibition and some regulated commercial model, such 
as govern alcohol in much of the world. For their part, drug policy 
researchers have pointed out that there are actually many more reg-
ulatory options for legal cannabis markets than alcohol style regu-
lation, including “social clubs,” “grow-your-own,” “not-for-pro t” 
and government monopoly. These “in-between”-models could be 
safe and feasible options for policymakers to move a meaningful 
distance along the spectrum towards legally regulated cannabis 
markets without crossing over to full commercial availability. Yet 
these options are often not developed in any detail or adapted to 
a speci c jurisdiction, reducing the likelihood they will be taken 
seriously by policymakers tasked with developing new regulatory 
regimes for cannabis.
Jonathan Caulkins is quite right to argue that, when prohibi-
tion is rejected, a fundamental question is what kinds of organi-
zations should be granted the right to produce and distribute the 
formerly prohibited good? Allowing a commercial market is just 
one of many architectures for legalization, one at the far end of 
a broad spectrum of options. Moving directly from prohibition 
to commercial legalization leaps from one extreme to the other, 
bypassing other, safer forms of legalization, including the non-
pro t model. Furthermore, it is an irreversible leap, says Jonathan 
Caulkins: “Once created, a multi-billion dollar industry will use 
its clout to lobby for self-preservation and more. Entrepreneurs 
from the industry already occupy many seats on Oregon’s recre-
ational marijuana rules advisory committee, and there are real 
concerns that the tobacco industry will expand into the cannabis 
product space after national legalization. Welcoming free-market 
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dynamism makes sense for most products. Private industry invents 
new product forms, drives down costs, and markets aggressively 
to expand consumption. Those are boons when consumers can be 
trusted to make prudent decisions concerning the purchase and 
use of those goods.”
Yet, it is important to note that cannabis is also consumed by 
people with a substance use disorder, and by daily and near-daily 
users. Obviously, most people who use cannabis are entirely happy 
with that consumption. But the smaller number of problem users 
consume far more and more often. From the suppliers’ perspective, 
a daily user is as pro table as almost 15 occasional users, according 
to Jonathan Caulkins. Problem use is a major driver of sales and 
pro ts. If we want to undercut the black market without promot-
ing greater problem use, a commercial market with pro t-driven 
companies de nitely has more disadvantages compared to a mar-
ket with not-for-pro t corporations, or a co-op or “cannabis club 
model”.
4. This Book’s Objective 
In Belgium, a similar development as described above, has been 
observed. On the one hand the national government is in denial 
of the changing cannabis policy landscape elsewhere and it seems 
to su er from inertia in acting upon calls for change from local 
authorities and grassroots movements. These local authorities are 
confronted with a range of problems that, in the end, cannot be 
solved without some kind of a regulated and transparent supply 
chain of recreational cannabis.
In November 2013, I published an academic vision statement 
together with two academics from other disciplines (Professor Paul 
De Grauwe, an economist, and Professor Jan Tytgat, a toxicologist) 
to stimulate the cannabis reform debate in Belgium. We presented 
a critical evaluation of the Belgian cannabis policy. The Belgian 
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cannabis policy is based on honorable objectives, but it did not 
succeed in realizing its major goals – a decline in the number of 
cannabis consumers, and particularly the number of individuals 
with cannabis-related problems, a decrease in the physical and psy-
chosocial damage caused by cannabis abuse or misuse, and a drop 
in the number of negative consequences of the cannabis phenom-
enon for society (public nuisance among other things) – over the 
past decades. The government expenditure on fruitless repressive 
strategies that aim to reduce supply, is substantial. This expendi-
ture displaces more cost-e  cient investments based on scienti c 
evidence about e ective prevention, about the reduction of demand 
and about harm reduction. In our vision statement of 2013, we 
argued that the policy option for a regulated cannabis market is a 
serious one that should be studied as careful as the continuation or 
intensi cation of the current policy.
In a second attempt in 2016 to fuel the debate on cannabis 
policy reform, we launched a concrete and detailed scenario for a 
regulated cannabis market. This books summarizes the proposal, 
which aimed to initiate a wide social, political and academic dis-
cussion in Belgium. Given the fact that the prohibitionist approach 
imposed on cannabis by the international drug control system still 
persists in many countries around the world, while at the same time 
local and regional authorities – sometimes pressured by grassroots 
movements - are advocating change, I believe the scenario we elab-
orated contains a relevant contribution to the debates elsewhere in 
the world. In many countries around the world, cannabis policy 
reform is still pending, or has been inadequate, and I hope this book 
contributes to a new genre of publications that think about how 
best to design and implement approaches to legalization.
Much remains uncertain about cannabis legalization. For in-
stance, it remains entirely unclear how legalization-induced in-
creases in cannabis use will a ect use and abuse of alcohol and to-
bacco. Advocates hope cannabis will substitute for alcohol, thereby 
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reducing the myriad problems caused by alcohol abuse. Pessimists 
fear that greater cannabis use and dependence will translate into 
greater tobacco smoking and alcohol abuse. No one knows for sure; 
even if we had perfect studies concerning substitution and com-
plementarity in the past for  uctuations in supply while cannabis 
remains prohibited, the relationships could be di erent in the long-
run after full legalization at the national level. Since the scale of 
alcohol and tobacco-related death and harm are so enormous com-
pared to cannabis-speci c outcomes, just this one (among many) 
key uncertainty makes it impossible to know today whether we 
will celebrate or rue legalization in decades to come. That strongly 
suggests implementing legalization slowly and by stages. That is 
why my central argument with this book is that for governments 
that decide to reject prohibition – and there are many legitimate 
reasons to do so – the most fundamental question is what kinds 
of players should be granted the right to produce and distribute 
cannabis. My argument would be: start with a market restricted to 
not-for-pro ts, or even just cannabis clubs and co-ops that sell to 
members only. After a decade, if few problems are detected, then 
the right to produce could be extended to other kinds of organi-
zations. The scenario I present in this book provides one concrete 
example of what the  rst step of such a staged approach might look 
like. Obviously, with the input of drug experts from all relevant 
sectors and disciplines, the scenario presented here can be re ned 
and adapted to the local context of a particular country, and at least 
form the basis for a debate about possible regulation models. We 
can imagine many variants.
5. This Book’s Structure 
In Chapter 1, I provide a description of the Belgian drug policy and 
the most important recent trends and debates around cannabis in 
my own country. Obviously, as explained above, the Belgian drug 
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policy is not the focus of this book at all. The principal aim of this 
book is to present a detailed and concrete scenario for the develop-
ment of a non-pro t-driven legal cannabis market, and to contribute 
to the current debates elsewhere in the world on how best to de-
sign and implement approaches to legalization of cannabis. Before 
diving into the details of the scenario presented in the following 
chapters, it seems appropriate to provide at least some elementary 
background information about the context in which this scenario 
was developed.
In Chapter 2, I summarize a few important reasons why reg-
ulation of the cannabis market is a serious option. Then I present 
the major points that form the foundation of the concrete scenario 
for a regulated cannabis market. I describe the principal objectives 
and principles of the proposal presented in this book.
In Chapter 3, I present the scenario in detail. First I argue that 
there should be a preparatory phase before the whole implemen-
tation process, in which: (1) the scenario is worked out in detail; 
(2) an information campaign is launched, through which citizens 
are fully informed about the objectives and modalities concerning 
regulation; (3) preparatory scienti c research is conducted if neces-
sary. In any process of cannabis policy reform it is very important 
to preserve the balance between the (urgent) implementation of a 
new policy and the risks of an overhastily introduced policy. This 
is why I argue for a cautious scenario, in two phases (see  gure 1). 
In a  rst phase, three legally regulated channels can be created. A 
 rst pillar is regulation of the cultivation and possession of cannabis 
for strict personal use (“home growing”). A second cornerstone of 
the proposed model is the cannabis social club(s). These clubs are 
not-for-pro t associations that operate as a private club for canna-
bis users, who collectively grow cannabis in order to provide for 
the personal consumption of the members. The third pillar is the 
supply of medicinal cannabis to particular groups of patients, for 
medical use only.
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Figure 1: A Cautious Scenario for a Regulated and Not-For-Profit Cannabis Market, in Two Phases.
In Chapter 4, I elaborate the second phase – after a serious 
evaluation of the implementation of the model and its e ects on 
numerous parameters, the model can be adjusted if necessary: it 
must be veri ed which parts of the new regulation should become 
less or more strict, and if additional channels for cannabis produc-
tion and distribution can be created or not.
Finally, I discuss some necessary preconditions for the imple-
mentation of the scenario in Chapter 5.
The draft of this scenario is based on scienti c  ndings from 
the international literature. In particular, the publications of the 
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (particularly the guide How to 
regulate cannabis. A practical guide, 2013) were valuable sources of 
inspiration. These manuals list the major challenges, scienti c  nd-
ings and di erent options concerning regulation. In this book, I try 
to construct a scenario on the basis of the scholarly literature that 
takes into account the speci c context and the way the cannabis 
market manifests itself in many countries nowadays. To improve 
the readability of this document, I did not use an academic refer-
ence style as often seen in academic journals or monographs, but I 
mention all the sources I’ve used at the end of this book.
1CH A P T ER  1
The Background: Belgian Drug Policy and 
Recent Trends and Debates on Cannabis
Cannabis policy in Belgium is not the focus of this book at all. In the following chapters, I want to present a detailed and concrete 
scenario for the development of a non-pro t-driven, legal cannabis 
market, and in doing so, I hope to contribute to the current de-
bates elsewhere in the world on how best to design and implement 
approaches to legalization of cannabis. Having said this, it seems 
appropriate to provide at least some background information about 
the national context in which this scenario was developed, before 
diving into the details of the scenario presented in the following 
chapters. That is why I provide in this chapter a description of the 
Belgian drug policy and the most important recent trends and de-
bates around cannabis in my own country.
1. The Belgian Legal and Drug Policy Framework on Cannabis 
The  rst Belgian narcotics law dates from February 24, 1921, and 
has since been amended by two laws in 2003 and several royal 
decrees and ministerial circular letters. These changes to the 
Narcotic Drug Law of 1921 were implementations of the drug 
policy as set out by the Federal Drug Policy Note of 2001. This 
document—which was largely based on the recommendations of 
a parliamentary commission on drugs (1997)—provided a frame-
work for the juridical-technical debates and reforms of the Belgian 
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drug law in 2003 and 2004. The 2001 Federal Drug Policy Note 
takes a “normalizing” stance and considers drug use to be a social 
reality. According to this policy note, drug use should primarily be 
considered as a problem of public health rather than belonging to 
the criminal sphere.
The 2001 Federal Drug Policy Note created the framework for 
an integral and integrated drug policy. This means that drug use is 
seen as a multidimensional problem (socioeconomic, health, crime) 
that accordingly requires a multidimensional approach wherein all 
relevant sectors (prevention, repression, treatment, harm reduc-
tion) should play their parts. Due to the complex state structure of 
Belgium, the framework consequently implied that all policy levels 
(federal, regional, local) and sectors are involved with their partic-
ular competences. The main priorities of the Belgian government 
were to reduce the number of drug users, to reduce the physical and 
mental e ects related to drug use, and to reduce negative conse-
quences such as public nuisance and crime in society. Accordingly, 
the current Belgian drug policy is built on three pillars: (1) pre-
vention of drug consumption; (2) harm reduction, treatment, and 
reintegration; and (3) repression as an option ultimum remedium.
With the translation of the Federal Policy Note into law, can-
nabis received a separate “status” from other illegal drugs (such as 
cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, speed, etc.). Furthermore, the law provided 
a distinction between (1) minors (under eighteen years old accord-
ing to Belgian law); (2) adults who use or possess illegal drugs; and 
(3) adults who use or possess cannabis. For minors, the possession 
and use of any illegal drug is prohibited without exceptions. For 
adults, the possession of a small amount of cannabis (maximum 
three grams or one female plant) for personal use has the “lowest 
prosecution priority.” In practice, this means that law enforcement 
will only draft a simpli ed police report. However, this can only be 
the case when aggravating circumstances are absent—such as the 
involvement of minors, being part of an organization linked to drug 
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tra  cking, problematic use, causing physical injuries to others, or 
causing public nuisance. If any of these aggravating circumstances 
are applicable, the police will make a regular police report and in-
form the public prosecutor. These cases are punishable by a  ne or 
incarceration. Lastly, the possession of other illegal drugs remains 
prohibited for adults.
From a legal perspective, cannabis still is an illegal substance 
in Belgium. Its possession, use, distribution, and tra  cking can be 
subject to criminal or administrative sanctions. Moreover, since the 
federal elections in 2014, the new government opted for a return to 
a zero-tolerance drug policy. The political parties in power agreed 
that the existing “tolerance” for cannabis was a problem, and in 
their governmental agreement it was stated that “the possession 
of drugs is forbidden. The use of drugs in public space cannot be 
the subject of any tolerance policy” (Federal Government 2014, 92).
2. Belgian Framework for Medicinal Cannabis 
In Belgium, the supply and possession of herbal cannabis for medic-
inal purposes is prohibited. Non-pharmaceutical products based on 
cannabis and cannabis derivatives (e.g., cannabis oil, tincture) are 
not allowed either. Only licensed pharmaceutical medicines based 
on cannabis were made available in 2015 in Belgium.
In June 2015, a royal decree came into force that regulates 
products that contain tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). This royal de-
cree formally prohibits the distribution of the cannabis plant for 
medicinal usage. Until now, the only cannabinoid-based medicine 
that has obtained a license to be sold in Belgium, is Sativex, a can-
nabinoid oral spray. Sativex can only be used as a treatment for 
spasticity caused by multiple sclerosis, and it can only be used by 
patients for which other treatments have been proven to be ine ec-
tive. In addition, there must be a signi cant clinical improvement 
regarding spasticity in a  rst test phase. A patient can only receive 
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reimbursement when this medicine is prescribed by a neurologist 
and obtained from a hospital pharmacy. Any Belgian physician has 
the “therapeutic freedom” to prescribe Sativex, but when physicians 
who are not neurologists prescribe the medicine for patients who 
do not su er from spasticity due to MS (e.g., for chronic pain), the 
treatment will not be reimbursed.
Cannabis products containing solely cannabidiol (CBD) and no 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) cannot be sold in Belgium as thera-
peutic agents. Until now, there have been no CBD products that 
have obtained a license from the Federal Agency for Medicines 
and Health Products (FAMPH) to be sold as regulated medicines.
Belgian patients who do not su er from MS are forced to rely on 
illegal sources of cannabis, including home cultivation, web stores, 
street circuits, social supply, Dutch co eeshops, and Dutch pharma-
cies. The cultivation of cannabis in Belgium is formally prohibited; 
this also applies to cannabis cultivated for medicinal or scienti c 
purposes. Belgium has signed the 1961 UN Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs. Countries that want to legally regulate cannabis 
cultivation have to create a special o  ce that is responsible for 
the production of cannabis for medical or scienti c purposes—the 
Dutch O  ce of Medicinal Cannabis (OMC) is an example of such 
a government o  ce. Until now, no such o  ce has been established 
in Belgium, and there seems to be no legal initiative for setting up 
such a framework in the near future.
In practice, Belgian residents with serious medical ailments 
other than MS do have a particular option to obtain medicinal can-
nabis products of pharmaceutical quality, but this implies breaking 
the law. Since physicians in Belgium have “therapy freedom,” they 
are not in violation when they prescribe unlicensed medicines for 
their patients, such as medicinal cannabis. The Belgian law on 
healthcare professions states that practitioners cannot be subject to 
regulatory limitations in the choice of the means used, either for 
making a diagnosis, for setting up a treatment and its execution, or 
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for the execution of magisterial preparations. This means that any 
physician in Belgium is allowed to prescribe medicinal cannabis 
for any possible indication, but on his or her own responsibility 
and with the consent of the patient. With this prescription, Belgian 
patients can go to pharmacies in the Netherlands that sell medicinal 
cannabis produced by Bedrocan, the only company in that country 
that is licensed to produce medicinal cannabis.
Buying cannabis in a Dutch pharmacy is the only way that 
customers are guaranteed safe and standardized cannabis. 
Furthermore, by doing so, the patients’ treatments are supervised 
by physicians. However, transporting medicinal cannabis from the 
Netherlands to Belgium remains an illegal activity, which means 
that they risk prosecution for import of illegal drugs when they cross 
the border between the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, most 
Belgian patients do not live close to the Dutch border. For them it 
is a long journey to the Netherlands. Those people have a choice: 
either they can buy a larger amount of cannabis to ensure a supply 
for a longer period (but at the same they risk a more severe pun-
ishment when caught), or they can choose to buy a small amount 
(but then they have to travel more often to the Netherlands). For 
people who are su ering from severe medical problems, neither of 
these options is ideal.
Some law proposals have been submitted to the Belgian par-
liament, but any attempt to create a broader legal framework for 
medicinal cannabis products has been unsuccessful.
3. A Particular Phenomenon: Cannabis Social Clubs in Belgium 
The cannabis social club (CSC or “club”) model has been present 
in Belgium for over a decade now, as the  rst CSC was established 
in 2006. The emergence of the model in the country follows the 
issue of the 2005 ministerial guidelines, which attributed the lowest 
priority for prosecution of instances concerning the possession of 
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one cannabis plant or three grams of cannabis—in the absence of 
aggravating circumstances or public disorder (as I described earlier). 
The initiators of this  rst CSC argued that by imposing a limit of 
one plant per member, the cannabis club would respect the threshold 
established by the ministerial guidelines. They assumed cannabis 
clubs would thus also be considered as a “low priority” for law 
enforcement. The other CSCs that were created subsequently have 
followed the same reasoning, and thus the principle of “one plant 
per member” became central to the functioning of Belgian CSCs 
(as further described below).
As opposed to the cannabis clubs in Uruguay—which form one 
of the legally regulated supply channels for recreational cannabis 
users—a regulatory framework for these CSCs has never been cre-
ated in Belgium, leaving the CSCs in a rather vulnerable position. 
Many CSCs in Belgium have been the target of police interventions, 
with their crops being con scated by the police, and have faced 
criminal lawsuits. To some extent, this explains the volatility that 
has characterized the presence of the model in Belgium since 2006, 
with CSCs closing down and new ones appearing. Circa February 
2014, I identi ed 5 active CSCs, with the model being represented 
in both Flanders and Wallonia. A more recent study by my col-
league Mafalda Pardal o ers an overview of the changes in the 
Belgian CSC landscape since its inception and found that only two 
of the previously active CSCs remain operational today. A total of 
seven active CSCs, and  ve inactive CSCs were identi ed by her. 
In comparison to other settings where the model is active (in par-
ticular Uruguay and Spain), the number of Belgian CSCs remains 
relatively small.
The CSCs remain up until today the result of grassroots e orts 
within the drug user movement. Some of the CSC activists have 
in fact also been involved in other local drug user groups and or-
ganizations, and had closely followed the earlier emergence and 
development of the CSC model in Spain. The relations among the 
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Belgian CSC activists are not always characterized by collaboration, 
and there seem to be factions or cliques among them. Perhaps in 
part due to that lack of trust among the various CSC representa-
tives, no supra-level organization such as a CSC Federation (which 
exists for instance in Spain and in the United Kingdom) have been 
created.
Beyond that, according to a recent account, the Belgian CSCs 
have also engaged with other organizations in the broader canna-
bis movement, including grow shops and seed banks in Belgium 
and abroad, as well as cannabis testing labs or providers of such 
testing kits. The Belgian CSCs are also aware of and have contacts 
with CSCs in other countries, and have also enrolled in other na-
tional, regional or European lobbying or advocacy organizations, 
such as the European Coalition for Just and E ective Drug Policies 
(ENCOD) or the Dutch Alliance for the Abolition of Cannabis 
Prohibition (VOC).
The emergence and development of the CSC model (and move-
ment) in Belgium has gathered some media attention. The CSCs 
have communicated about their goals and activities through that 
channel, thus reaching a broader audience. However, the coverage 
of the CSC model in the domestic print media has tended to focus 
primarily on criminal justice issues a ecting the CSCs which could 
result in negative representation. Belgian policy makers have shown 
limited involvement in discussing the model (at least through the 
media), which may suggest that an actual debate about this supply 
model has not fully been initiated yet.
The Belgian CSCs have typically been formalized as nonpro t 
organizations in the national registry for this type of associations. 
In their bylaws, the CSCs have explicitly introduced the supply of 
cannabis as a goal, often with reference to the principle of one plant 
per member. Access to these organizations and thus access to the 
cannabis produced by them is only open to members, who must 
also ful l speci c requirements. Candidate members typically must 
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be eighteen or twenty-one years old, Belgian residents or national, 
and declare already having used cannabis prior to their enrolment 
at the CSC. Di erent criteria may apply for individuals using can-
nabis for medical reasons seeking to join a CSC (for instance, such 
users may be asked to produce a medical prescription or recom-
mendation letter).
The cannabis supplied by the Belgian CSCs is produced by 
some of the members of each of the organizations, which typically 
receive a compensation for the cannabis grown. The cannabis pro-
duced is then delivered by the CSCs either at so-called “exchange 
fairs”, i.e., collective gatherings where the CSC members who have 
previously ordered cannabis from their CSC come together to col-
lect it; or directly at the CSC, at the member’s home or in a location 
previously agreed upon between the CSC and the member. Regular 
and independent toxicological testing of the cannabis produced by 
the Belgian CSCs is di  cult and expensive, and thus remains a 
weak point of the model as it exists in Belgium.
While these constitute typical practices of the Belgian CSCs, 
I should note that there is certainly diversity in terms of the func-
tioning of these organizations, and that multiple variants of a CSC 
model may actually co-exist in the country.
Most Belgian CSCs have at, some point in time, experienced 
legal problems following police interventions. Some of those cases 
are still under investigation or a verdict by the courts at stake has 
not yet been made. However, some of the concluded cases have had 
important implications for the further development of the model 
to date. On the one hand, the two cases involving the  rst Belgian 
CSC, which resulted in a favorable result for that club may have had 
a positive impact to the emergence of new CSCs in the country. The 
charges brought in the  rst of the two cases related to possession 
of cannabis and participation in a criminal organization. While 
initially condemned, when the case was brought to the Court of 
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Appeal, that Court was unable to pass judgement as the criminal 
prosecution had become time-barred.
The second court case involving that CSC came about in the se-
quence of two public demonstrations organized by the CSC (during 
which some CSC representatives planted cannabis seeds in pots), 
but the defendants were acquitted. This CSC has currently been 
subject to a new police intervention, with some of its representa-
tives being held in custody for a few weeks. So far, there has also 
been one documented case of a “shadow CSC” in Belgium, which 
has also been brought to court. In that case, the “CSC” was found 
to have many more plants than the number of members, and the 
operation was described as a façade for actual sales of cannabis.
One other CSC has been charged for both possession of can-
nabis and for facilitating the use of cannabis – with the decision of 
the Court of Appeal convicting the CSC representatives for the  rst 
o ence, but acquitting for the second. In another process involving 
this CSC, the public prosecutor asked for the formal dissolution 
of the organization as its bylaws explicitly mentioned a goal (and 
activities) which constituted a criminal fact (i.e., the cultivation 
and distribution of cannabis). This was, to my knowledge, the  rst 
case where the issue was raised, and may have implications for 
the future of the model in the country. That CSC has since then 
changed its bylaws, removing the controversial paragraphs, and 
has suspended the cultivation and distribution of cannabis among 
its members.
A recent press release by the Belgian College of Public 
Prosecutors refuted the interpretation of the 2005 Ministerial 
Guidelines often brought forward by the CSCs and activists to 
justify the legitimacy (and legality) of their activities, making the 
stance of that body more clear – and which could represent a more 
repressive approach towards the remaining CSCs active in the 
country.
A  nal observation relates to medicinal cannabis social clubs. In 
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Belgium, two cannabis social clubs have installed formal arrange-
ments adapted to medicinal cannabis users’ needs. One club has 
a separate sub-unit for medicinal users, the other club exclusively 
serves medicinal users. These structural arrangements for medic-
inal members include reduced prices of cannabis strains as well 
as  exibility in relation to frequency of distribution and quantity 
distributed to medicinal members. The membership criteria of 
both clubs are more strict as compared to other CSCs: users who 
wish to enroll at the medical unit or at the medical cannabis social 
club need to present a medical certi cate or prescription. The other 
cannabis social clubs in Belgium allow medicinal cannabis users as 
well, but they do not provide particular services to them.
4. Recent Debates on Cannabis Regulation 
Belgium has faced mounting calls from academia, civil society and 
professionals for comprehensive reform of the drug policy, and the 
cannabis policy in particular. I already referred to the academic 
vision statement I published with two colleagues in 2013, in which 
we critically questioned Belgium’s cannabis policy. A year later, two 
other well-known and in uential criminologists (Brice De Ruyver 
and Cyrille Fijnaut) published a book called “The third way. A plea 
for a balanced cannabis policy”. One of the premises by these authors 
was that a strict, controlled and limited form of cannabis regulation 
can be incorporated within a (possibly reformed) framework of 
United Nations and European legislation. Both scholars argued that 
cultivation of cannabis for personal consumption, cannabis social 
clubs and the distribution of medicinal cannabis to speci c groups 
of patients could be regulated.
In 2016, the detailed scenario for a regulated nonpro t cannabis 
market presented in this book was published in a Dutch and French 
version (Belgium has three o  cial languages – Dutch, French and 
German – but French is used by 33% of the population and Dutch or 
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Flemish is used by more than 60% of the population). Most recently, 
an interdisciplinary working group at the Catholic University of 
Leuven has composed a working group that aims to bring together 
existing scholarship and scienti c expertise on cannabis policy. The 
recommendations of this working group (consisting of 15 profes-
sors from di erent academic disciplines) were presented in March 
2018, and called for a fundamental reform of the country’s cannabis 
policy.
These claims for a policy reform were also picked up by vari-
ous professionals in the drugs  eld. The three main organizations 
that coordinate and represent all treatment and prevention centers 
specialized in alcohol and drug problems in Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels have issued vision statements on cannabis policy. These 
three associations advocate for a reform of the country’s cannabis 
policy. Public health considerations should be the primary rationale 
of our cannabis policy, not repressive strategies. A new approach in 
cannabis policy should aim at an e ective reduction of health risks; 
while the current criminalization stigmatizes cannabis users and 
impairs their well-being. The Walloon and Brussels organizations 
advocate even more explicitly for a regulated model of cannabis 
supply.
A remarkable new “player” in the debate is Peter Muyshondt, 
a deputy chief of police. As a drug warrior, he had been thrown 
into a moral con ict after his brother died of a drug overdose nine 
years ago. Losing his brother to drugs changed him from a drug 
warrior to an advocate of legally regulating and controlling drugs. 
He published two books (in 2015 and 2017), and became the face of 
the campaign “Anyone’s Child: Families for Safer Drug Control” 
in Belgium.
Civil society advocates have also entered the debate. In June 
2016, the two oldest Belgian cannabis social clubs joined e orts in 
developing a “Blueprint for the regulation of cannabis in Belgium”. 
The proposal included three di erent legal channels for the supply 
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of cannabis: home growing, cannabis social clubs and supply for 
medical reasons via pharmacies. In 2017, a civil society movement – 
STOP1921 – was formed to campaign for a reform of the Belgian 
drug policy. The name of the initiative refers to the year 1921, 
when the  rst penal law on drugs in Belgium was voted, and the 
foundations for a repressive policy for the next century were cre-
ated. The movement consists of individual citizens and dozens of 
organizations that want to push the political actors to take action.
Meanwhile, the Belgian political world seems to be in denial 
of the changing international policy landscape and of the calls for 
policy reform from academia, professional stakeholders and civil 
society. Youth sections of the green, socialist and liberal political 
parties – which can proclaim and communicate their own political 
agenda towards the party – explicitly plead for the legalization and 
regulation of cannabis, both in Flanders and in Wallonia. The youth 
department of the Christian party in Wallonia also advocates for 
regulating the cannabis market; the Flemish section rejects the 
idea.
Some of the mother parties – especially in the green, socialist 
and communist political families - endorse the idea of drug policy 
reform and regulation of cannabis. The socialist party in Wallonia 
is the most explicit: the Walloon Parti Socialiste (PS) advocates can-
nabis regulation (they submitted a law proposal in December 2017) 
and they would like to set up a cannabis social club in the city 
of Mons as a scienti c experiment (I mentioned earlier several 
similar attempts in other European cities). However, the political 
parties that hold power in the Belgian government, the Christian-
democrats, the liberals and the nationalist-conservative parties have 
written a zero-tolerance policy into their government agreement in 
2014. Current o  cial policy declarations are limited to a statement 
such as “We merely apply the law and principles as described in our 
government agreement.”
More importantly, after more than 80 years of socialist local 
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governments in the large city of Antwerp, the Flemish nationalists 
are now the most powerful party in the local city council since 2013. 
The mayor – and party leader of the Flemish nationalist and conser-
vative party – is an avid ideologically inspired opponent of cannabis 
regulation, who wants to send a clear message that illegal drugs 
are dangerous and criminal. This political party has reinvented 
the “war on drugs” in Antwerp, resulting in a marked increase of 
police capacity in local drug teams, more arrests and  nes for drug 
dealers and users, treatment programs as alternative sentencing 
trajectories, and more con scated drugs. At the same time, the 
city has witnessed a spectacular increase in shooting incidents and 
violent retaliations. Most recently, another dimension was added to 
the debate: the role of organized crime in cocaine tra  cking in the 
Antwerp port (considered to be one of the major hubs for cocaine 
tra  cking in Europe), and how to tackle it. The last few years, the 
“war on drugs” in Antwerp has become a “national” topic, in the 
sense that it frequently features in columns, newspapers and docu-
mentaries. In the face of local elections in 2018 and federal elections 
in 2019, the controversy between advocates of drug policy reform 
and supporters of the repressive “war on drugs” might become an 
election issue. At the time of writing this book, I cannot predict 
whether cannabis policy in Belgium will remain stuck in a status 
quo, or evolve into a nationwide war on drugs, or in a process of 
drug policy reform.
Regardless of the fact whether or not Belgian cannabis policy 
will evolve, and if so in which sense, I am quite con dent that 
similar debates are being held in many other countries around 
the world. On the one hand, local contexts, actors and factors may 
di er from one another, but on the other hand, it is true that there 
is a similar disenchantment with the current cannabis regime in 
many countries. In the next chapter, I o er some arguments for a 
reconsideration of prohibitionist cannabis policies.
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CH A P T ER  2
Cannabis Regulation: What It Is, What It Is 
Not, and Why We Need to Consider It
There are many reasons and arguments to claim that regulation of the cannabis market is a serious option. Any reader who is 
familiar with the issue of cannabis policy reform, will  nd nothing 
new in this chapter. For other readers, I use this chapter to brie y 
present some of the main arguments. Then I describe the principal 
objectives and principles of the detailed scenario for a regulated 
cannabis market presented in the third chapter of this book.
1. Why Regulation Is a Serious Option 
The main goals of cannabis policies in most countries and jurisdic-
tions can be summarized as follows: (1) a reduction in the number 
of dependent citizens; (2) a decrease in the physical and psychosocial 
damage caused by abuse of cannabis; (3) a drop in the number of 
negative consequences of the cannabis phenomenon (public nui-
sance and criminality).
Until today, most governments opt for an integrated approach 
in which prevention, treatment and repression are combined. With 
regard to the supply of cannabis, national governments invest in 
a repressive policy in regard to criminal organizations who have 
strong ties with cannabis trade. Criminal law and enforcement 
e orts of the police and justice system are the spearheads of most 
cannabis policies around the world today.
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After decades of mainly repressive cannabis policies, it is time 
for a critical evaluation of the outcome of the enforced measures. In 
most countries, the available  gures clearly indicate that repressive 
cannabis policies have not led to a decline in cannabis use in these 
societies and that the number of people who struggle with cannabis 
abuse or dependence appears to have increased.
A policy attempting to limit the supply of cannabis with re-
pression is faced with a fundamental paradox. The more intense 
the repression is, and the better it succeeds in limiting supply and 
creating scarcity, the higher the price will be for the consumer and 
consequently the pro tability of the production and distribution of 
cannabis. The high pro ts have a great attraction for (millions of) 
people who want to take risks, for “have-nots” who have nothing 
to lose or for people who are not afraid of crime or violence. The 
more intense the repressive approach, the more people dive into the 
production and distribution of drugs. This paradox has a number 
of important e ects.
First of all, repressive cannabis policies quickly face their lim-
itations. The fact is that the e  ciency of this approach is limited by 
de nition, because of the unstoppable increase in willing producers 
and distributors. This way, many illegal channels arise which gov-
ernments can hardly control. Given the supply of drugs is extraor-
dinary pro table thanks to its illegality, the suppliers have extensive 
 nancial resources with which they can hide their activities in a 
way that is becoming more and more sophisticated, or with which 
they can escape repression by bribery and corruption.
Repressive cannabis policies cannot signi cantly in uence the 
supply of cannabis or the access to cannabis for users, let alone re-
duce it. They only lead to geographical shifts and transformations 
of the phenomenon. In practice, an intensi ed repressive approach 
applied to every drug user and everywhere is not feasible, due to 
budgetary limitations and the necessity to  ght other criminal 
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phenomena. The result is often a form of selectivity in the policy 
towards nuisance and in detection, prosecution and punishment.
The major consequence of the paradox is that it is an incentive 
for crime. The supply often occurs illegally and attracts a great 
number of suppliers competing intensely with each other. The 
illegal environment is bound to become a criminal environment. 
The harsher the law enforcement in practice, the more the illegal 
market is characterized by systemic violence (so-called “rip-o s”, 
shootings, and so on) and the more “criminal” it becomes. The 
increased risk of arrest puts o  small-scale grower hobbyists and 
only the professional criminal operators remain. The cannabis ban 
also leads indirectly to corruption, money laundering operations, 
and damage to other economic sectors. On an international scale, 
it leads to violent con icts, drug money used for the arms trade, 
 nancing of terrorism and war, threat to democratic institutions 
and ecological damage.
Another consequence is that it is not possible to control the 
composition, the purity, the potency and the quality of illegal can-
nabis in general. The current Dutch or Belgian marihuana contains 
much higher concentrations of THC than 30 or 40 years ago, but 
that is just a consequence of the repressive policy. Growers prefer-
ably grow the strongest possible cannabis varieties as a result of the 
risk of getting caught.
Moreover, cannabis is grown in uncontrollable circumstances 
nowadays: it may contain harmful fungi, bacteria, pesticides or 
other contaminants (heavy metals, glass particles, and so on). In 
this context, we can only try to warn people when encounter-
ing critical danger (“early warning”), but we cannot take action. 
Besides, governments do not have the ability to restrict or in u-
ence the marketing strategies of the cannabis producers, as they 
do with the legal drug industries. If we compare a few things with 
alcohol and tobacco, a more consistent attitude of the government 
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concerning the quality, the quantity and the labelling of cannabis 
is at least advisable.
In many countries, the amount of spending related to repres-
sion (i.e., the expenses for the detection and settlement of violations 
of the drug legislation by the police and justice system) is much 
higher compared to the public expenditure on prevention and treat-
ment. This huge expenditure goes hand in hand with fruitless 
strategies that aim to reduce supply, and with a con nement policy. 
This expenditure displaces more cost-e  cient investments based 
on scienti c evidence on e ective prevention, on demand reduction 
and on harm reduction. In my view, government expenditure must 
be spent on activities which clearly contribute to the realization of 
the major policy objectives. We cannot continue to carry on with 
symbolic investments.
2. Basic Principles for a Regulated Model 
Repressive cannabis policies have failed to realize their major goals 
during the past decades. In my opinion, a regulated cannabis mar-
ket o ers the possibility to reduce the substantial government ex-
penditure that goes hand in hand with the con nement policy and 
with the fruitless  ght against the black market. At the same time, 
we can make more cost-e  cient investments based on scienti c 
evidence about the reduction of demand and about harm reduc-
tion. The major objectives of the policy in the scenario I present in 
the next chapter, remain: (1) a reduction in the number of citizens 
that use cannabis in a problematic way (and the reinforcement of 
the social norm of non-use); (2) a reduction in the physical and psy-
chosocial damage caused by drug abuse; and (3) a decrease in the 
negative consequences of the drug phenomenon for society (among 
which public nuisance). In the long term, the cannabis policy has to 
lead – as has been achieved with the tobacco policy - to a decrease 
of the general prevalence of cannabis use and the postponement of 
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the  rst use of cannabis (in other words: an increase in the age when 
someone experiments for the  rst time with cannabis).
2.1. Objectives of a Regulation of the Cannabis Market 
A successful policy is a strategy that actually succeeds in controlling 
the risks of drug use as much as possible and at the same time 
strictly advises against the use of psychoactive drugs. A regulated 
market aims to:
• control all aspects of the production of cannabis;
• control the way cannabis products are available;
• pursue a price-conscious policy concerning cannabis products;
• control the sales outlets of cannabis;
• increase the controls on the users and the locations where 
cannabis can be used.
Additional objectives of the proposed reform of the cannabis 
policy include:
• the provision of legal supply channels, so that the can-
nabis user does not have to get involved with criminal 
environments;
• the reduction of illegal channels, the weakening and in the 
long term the elimination of the black market in cannabis and 
the deprivation of an important source of income for or-
ganized criminals, and in doing so taking away their eco-
nomic power;
• the possibility of controlling the composition, the purity, 
the potency and the quality of cannabis in a general sense, 
for the protection of public health;
• the control of marketing strategies of cannabis producers, as we 
also do with legal drug industries (e.g., tobacco);
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• the reduction of the caseload in the law enforcement system by 
reducing the number of cannabis-related cases that have to 
be detected and judged;
• the reduction of the prison population by reducing the number 
of people that are imprisoned for cannabis-related crimes;
• the reduction of selectivity in the approach to public nuisance 
and the detection of cannabis-related o ences;
• the  ght against environmental pollution caused by large-scale 
illegal cannabis production (cannabis plantations);
• the promotion of more cost-e  cient investments based on 
scienti c evidence about e ective prevention, about the reduc-
tion of demand and about harm reduction;
• making the job of prevention workers and social workers eas-
ier by making their target audience more easily accessible 
and increasing budgets for education, harm reduction and 
treatment.
2.2. The Option for Stricter Regulation 
There is a large spectrum of legal and political models available 
to regulate the production, the supply and the use of cannabis (or 
other narcotics) (see  gure 2). At the one end of the spectrum is sit-
uated the criminal market, which is created because of a complete 
ban. Next, there are less punitive ban systems: models with a par-
tial/de facto/nearly legal supply, legally regulated market models 
with di erent restriction levels. At the other end of the spectrum 
are located the legal and commercial free markets.
Both extremes of the spectrum are completely non-regulated 
markets. The scenario I will present in the next chapter is based 
on the assumption that the two extreme options are connected 
with unacceptably high social and healthcare costs, because those 
who want to control the market (whether it is legal or illegal) are 
almost exclusively driven by pro t maximization. The options in 
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the middle o er the possibility to strictly regulate various aspects of 
the market, so that the potential adverse consequences of cannabis 
use and of the cannabis market can be kept to a minimum and the 
potential advantages can be maximized.
Figure 2: A Spectrum of the Possible Policy Options. Source: Transform (2007). After the 
War on Drugs. Tools for the Debate, p. 19. Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Bristol.
We should deliberately opt for a restrictive model, with a 
far-reaching form of government control and strict regulation. This 
kind of model is adaptable: when serious and careful evaluations 
are positive, it can be adapted in a later phase to a less restrictive 
and interventionistic model (if new social norms and social control 
mechanisms will be developed around the legal cannabis market). 
From a pragmatic and a policy perspective, this is a better scenario 
than the opposite scenario in which one has to retroactively intro-
duce more restrictive controls because the market was not regu-
lated enough. Our experience with the retroactive regulation of the 
tobacco and alcohol markets also taught us a lot, for that matter.
Additionally, the adaptable character of the model also works 
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for the opposite direction. If independent and scienti c evaluations 
show that certain regulations and provisions have to be formulated 
more rigidly, in that sense, the model can be re ned. And if – during 
a later phase – other players are admitted to the cannabis market 
(for instance, independent farmers or commercial companies), the 
proposed model with all its restrictions and regulations can be used 
unabridged for the additional legal channels.
2.3. Regulation: What It Is and What It Is Not 
Regulation of the cannabis market is – for sure – not inspired by 
a laissez-faire attitude. Proponents in the debate about regulation 
adhere to the repressive model obstinately out of the fear that 
the transformation of a war on drugs into regulation will lead to 
“free drugs for everyone”. Or they polarize determinedly the so-
cietal debate by arguing that there are only two possible attitudes: 
those who “want to do something about it (by using repression)” 
and those who “gave up the  ght.”. However, the debate concern-
ing “legalization” is only about regulating the phenomenon in 
another way.
Even though the terms “legalization” and “regulation” are in-
extricably bound up with each other, it is useful to make a clear 
distinction between these two. Legalization is merely a process of 
legalizing something presently illegal. Legal regulation, on the other 
hand, is the  nal product of that process and refers to a whole set of 
rules that control the product or behavior in question. If possible, 
I consciously avoid the term legalization, because some people 
misinterpret every proposal concerning legalization as a plea for 
some kind of commercial, unregulated free market. I do not agree 
with that idea at all. Basically, I plead for the creation of legal chan-
nels (thus a legalization), with a far-reaching form of stringent 
regulation.
Although regulation of drugs is often conceived as a 
23R e g u l a t i n g  C a n n a b i s
“liberalization” or a “weakening” of legislation, in fact it is the oppo-
site: the point is to  t the drug production and distribution into a legal 
framework, so strict controls can be applied. Strict control cannot be 
applied under a total cannabis ban. Regulation enables government 
to control which drugs can be sold, who can get access to them and 
where they can be sold. Criminals can decide this if there is a total 
ban. Everyone can buy every kind of drug as long as criminals control 
the trade. Drug dealers don’t ask for your identity card.
Another term that sometimes causes confusion is decriminal-
ization. Decriminalization generally means: the abolition of the 
penalization of certain behavior. In some countries, the possession 
of (a small quantity of) cannabis for personal use, has been decrim-
inalized. If this behavior is no longer punished or prosecuted, but 
not removed from the criminal law, we call this a decriminalization 
de facto. I need to point out here that decriminalization de facto here 
only refers to the possession of (a small amount of) cannabis and thus 
not to the production and distribution of cannabis. My proposal for a 
regulated cannabis market in this book concerns a decriminalization 
de jure: apart from the penalization for cannabis possession, the pe-
nalization for certain forms of cannabis production and distribution 
will be abolished and replaced by legally regulated channels.
Regulating does not necessarily mean “commercializing”. Nor 
does it mean the approval or promotion of intoxicant use, or the 
minimization of the dangers and risks of drug use. Besides, norms 
and lines are drawn by regulation. Every scenario of regulation cer-
tainly abolishes the (administrative or criminal) sanctions for pro-
duction, supply and possession of cannabis that take place within 
the parameters of the legal framework. However, all activities be-
yond the legal framework (such as selling cannabis to minors, driv-
ing a vehicle under the in uence of cannabis), remain punishable. 
Criminal norms and sanctions are used for: (1) producers, distribu-
tors or users who don’t stick to the rules; (2) non-licensed producers 
and distributors who continue to produce merely for money.
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I want to emphasize beforehand that legal regulation is no silver 
bullet or panacea for the drug problem. Regulation will not “solve” 
all problematic or harmful cannabis use. A cannabis ban doesn’t 
lead to a drug-free world; a regulated model cannot create a risk- or 
damage-free world. Legal regulation aims to reduce or exclude the 
damage resulting from prohibition or criminal markets.
Another frequently occurring criticism is that a form of regu-
lation will never help to dissolve the black market completely. It is 
correct to a certain extent: experience with tobacco showed that 
the illegal trade in cigarettes hasn’t disappeared completely and 
this can be explained partially because of important di erences be-
tween countries concerning tax regimes (so di erences in price) for 
tobacco products. But even if the black market does not disappear 
completely, there still would be – from a global perspective - a de-
cline in the black market (and its inherent criminality). Regulation 
will also end ine ective criminal law-enforcement tactics that keep 
on pushing the drug production and drug trade to other areas, 
without eliminating them (the so-called waterbed e ect). By ending 
the cannabis ban, more resources become available to deal with the 
remaining illegal channels and other forms of criminality. Besides, 
this challenge will get a lot easier because by cutting o  the illegal 
drug pro ts of criminals, their power will also shrink.
2.4. Seeking the Right Balance 
The reform of a cannabis policy and the development of a detailed 
blueprint for a regulated market is an exceptionally delicate balanc-
ing exercise for various reasons.
First, the international and juridical context has to be taken into 
account. The perception that the war against drugs is lost once 
and for all, will not come via the big transnational organizations 
and bureaucracies. An important change in discourse through in-
ternational treaties will not happen in the near future, because 
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unanimous consensus is necessary in this area, and because a num-
ber of traditional exceptionally repressive-minded countries can 
be obstructive in complicated procedures. Moreover, international 
organizations – such as the United Nations (by means of the ac-
tivities of the International Narcotics Control Board), but similarly 
the European action plans – aim for a uniform and stringent ap-
proach towards the drug phenomenon. But changes in the local 
and national policy will enfeeble the basic assumptions for the war 
against drugs. Meanwhile, many countries understand this. More 
and more countries, regions and cities are testing the  exibility 
of the international treaties. They do not want to wait longer for 
when and how the international treaties and agreements will be 
reformed, they want to develop as soon as possible a policy that 
enables them to get a grip on the phenomenon and its problematic 
sides. From a legal perspective, it is easy to argue that the inter-
national treaties allow regulation, on condition that the policy of 
other countries won’t get a spanner thrown in their wheels.
A lot has been written about how national governments have 
the  exibility under international law to regulate cannabis pro-
duction and trade for the purpose of recreational cannabis use. 
In 2014, a professor of criminal and procedural law, Piet Hein van 
Kempen, and a university teacher, Masha Fedorova, from the 
Radboud University of Nijmegen, concluded that legalization from 
the internal perspective of the current UN drug treaties (the Single 
Convention and the Convention against Illicit Tra  c) is not pos-
sible. But in a second study in 2016 they examined the issue from 
the external perspective of human rights treaties (the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European 
Social Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights). From 
this perspective, there seems to be a possibility for regulated le-
galization of cannabis production and trade for the purpose of the 
recreational user market.
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Pleas for a regulated cannabis production and trade for the pur-
pose of recreational use are often based on arguments connected 
with individual health and public health, the safety of citizens and 
the  ght against criminality. The intent of this argument is that 
these interests can be protected more e  ciently with the regulated 
cannabis model than with a prohibitive approach. That is interest-
ing with regard to human rights because a airs of health, safety 
and crime  ghting fall within the scope of that. So-called positive 
obligations for states arise from the right to health, the right to live, 
the right against inhuman treatment and the right to privacy. States 
have to take action to guarantee the fundamental rights of individ-
uals. In this case it is about obligations to actively promote the in-
dividual’s health and the public’s health, and to actively protect the 
life, the physical and psychological integrity and the private life of 
citizens. Van Kempen and Fedorova (2016) concluded that the regu-
lated approval of cannabis production and trade for recreational use 
can rely on positive obligations arising from international human 
rights treaties because of interests of individual health and public 
health, safety and crime prevention. According to international 
law, these positive human rights obligations take priority over the 
obligations from the UN drug treaties in cases where these con ict 
with each other. As far as there is the above-mentioned support, 
states also have by international law enough room to introduce that 
approval, despite their obligations to the drug treaties.
Nevertheless, a regulated model has to meet some essential 
conditions:
1 Relevant Importance for Human Rights 
First of all, the regulated approval of cannabis production and 
trade has to protect the interests that are relevant proceeding from 
positive human rights obligations. In the debate about regulation 
of cannabis production, various arguments in favor of regulation 
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come up that  nd support in one or more of these positive obliga-
tions. These relevant arguments include that regulated approval 
is advisable, because a regulation of this kind will lead to a better 
realization of the following interests: quality control of cannabis; 
control of the cannabis chain; reduction of peripheral criminality; 
protection of the health, the life and the physical and psychological 
integrity of neighbors; health protection for young people; decrease 
in public nuisance and damage that leads to direct limitation in the 
enjoyment of private life; and separation of the soft drugs market 
and the hard drugs market (which could put up a barrier against 
simultaneous availability and accessibility of soft drugs and hard 
drugs). It is argued that regulation of cannabis production and trade 
for recreational use applies under such circumstances as a positive 
obligation to the protection of human rights. Support for this regu-
lation is o ered by the right to health (as de ned in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and 
the European Social Charter (ESC)) and the rights concerning life, 
inhuman treatment and private life (as adopted in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).
2 Making a Reasonable Case for More Effective Human Rights Protection 
The state has to make a reasonable case for regulation, in the sense 
that it will realize the relevant positive human rights obligations 
(concerning health, life, physical and psychological integrity and 
private life) more e  ciently than an approach in which production 
and trade is prohibited. First, the regulated approval of cannabis 
production and trade for recreational use has to provide more ef-
fective and better human rights protection than a cannabis policy 
which is in accordance with the drug treaties (demand for higher 
e ectivity). Second, if a state wants to introduce a regulatory model, 
it will have to make a reasonable case that it will lead to more 
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e ective human rights protection than a prohibitive and repressive 
approach (demand for plausibility). Another question is whether a 
state that wants to regulate cannabis can immediately introduce it 
on a national level, or whether it should evaluate the e ects through 
pilots and experiments. It is up to the state to consider if pilots are 
useful and if their deployment is advisable.
3 Basis and National Democratic Decision-Making 
The judgement about whether state regulation of cannabis leads to 
more e ective protection of human rights should be the result of 
democratic decision-making procedures.
4 No Disadvantage for Foreign Countries: Closed System 
If a state allows a regulatory framework for cannabis production 
and trade for the recreational user market, then the control over 
this system must be to the extent that other countries su er no 
negative e ects from it, especially concerning exports from the 
regulating state. The protection of the interests of other countries 
must be guaranteed – and must preferably be even more e ective – 
than operating within a prohibitive policy in accordance with the 
drug treaties. Thus a state must provide a nationally-closed system 
for production, distribution and maybe for use.
5 Obligatory Policy of Discouragement 
If a state choses to regulate cannabis production and trade, the state 
has to provide for an adequate policy of discouragement, limitation 
and risk awareness of recreational cannabis use. This is not only 
necessary to create the most adequate assurance of human rights 
protection with the cannabis policy, but there is also an obligation 
in accordance with the right to health. By implementing this policy 
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of dissuasion, the state will have to see what eventually is the most 
e ective. Furthermore, it is important that obligations do not have 
to be implemented in such a way that they are counterproductive.
When designing a regulated cannabis model, these consider-
ations must be taken into account. A  rst phase must provide for a 
number of reforms that can be implemented within the parameters 
of the current international treaties, such as the decriminalization 
of possession for personal use, the cultivation for personal use and 
cannabis social clubs. These measures are relatively easy to imple-
ment and are well-founded on the basis of the present evidence base. 
In addition to this, these measures may illustrate the political inten-
tion of a government to reform the international legal framework. 
In a later phase, a government can create additional legal channels 
(and for instance allowing licensed companies), if it is willing to 
negotiate around the existing barriers in the current international 
law or if the international legal context evolves.
Second, by reforming the cannabis policy there has to be 
found an important balance between the (urgent) implementa-
tion of a new policy and the risks of an overhastily introduced policy. 
Experiences with regulating alcohol and tobacco and the devel-
opments in the American states Colorado and Washington, teach 
us that the rash introduction of a regulation, in which one must 
introduce retroactively more restrictive controls because the mar-
ket was not regulated enough, is a less desirable scenario. That is 
why I argue for a cautious and, at the start, very restrictive and 
governmentally-interventionist scenario.
Third, the development of an adequate regulated cannabis 
model is also a search for a design that on the one hand doesn’t 
include too many restrictions, so that people continue to supply them-
selves through a parallel illegal market, and on the other hand a 
design that doesn’t include too few restrictions, to make sure can-
nabis use and sale is not encouraged. There is and there always 
will be a tension between commercial interests (that are involved 
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with maximizing pro t, and thus tend to encourage and promote 
cannabis use) and the interest of public health (which is aimed at 
minimizing the damage and the risks, and thus at moderating 
and reducing cannabis use). It is my personal conviction that it is 
important to invest as much as possible in the protection of public 
health and to eliminate wherever possible the incentives for pro t 
maximization.
2.5. Lessons from the Past 
Of course there are various regulatory models for drugs that now-
adays are not criminalized, or in other words “legalized” (nicotine, 
alcohol, ca eine and a great number of pharmaceutical products). 
These models show important di erences depending on the prod-
uct (the regimes for alcohol and nicotine are very di erent and 
have been developed over time). The production and distribution 
of alcohol, nicotine and medical drugs (legal substances) are mainly 
regulated by a free-market principle. These models excellently il-
lustrate how a government with a legislative armamentarium (by 
which production, distribution and use don’t have to be completely 
criminalized) can impose rules: quality norms, age limits for users, 
laws against intoxication in public, limitations concerning advertis-
ing and marketing, obligations concerning packaging and instruc-
tion lea ets, a smoking ban in public spaces and so on.
On the other hand, the experience with these models has 
shown that commercializing substances can have unintended and 
undesirable consequences. If government regulations are insu  -
ciently restrictive and allow production of risky products through 
the mechanism of the free market (and thus by the principle of 
pro t maximization), some dangers will come to the surface:
• For decades, the tobacco industry has tried to minimize the 
dangers for health and the risk of dependence of nicotine 
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use. It remained silent as much as possible about its search 
for additives that could stimulate the absorption of nico-
tine. Tobacco companies could invest enormous amounts 
in scienti c research that bene tted their interests, and at 
the same time keep under wraps the funded research that 
didn’t please them.
• The alcohol industry invests millions of dollars in the devel-
opment and design of new (alcohol) products that help in-
crease alcohol consumption, sometimes with speci c target 
groups (the “breezers”, the “alcopops” …). If governments 
want to introduce measures for dealing with problematic 
alcohol use, alcohol industry lobbyists lobby as hard and 
as long as they can to eliminate all measures that aim to 
reduce availability (e.g., a ban on so-called happy hours, an 
increase of the age limits, a ban on sale in slot machines, 
night shops, petrol stations and so on).
• The same mechanisms are at play with pharmaceutical 
multinationals. Displeasing scienti c research is sometimes 
silenced in order for medicines to  nd their way to the 
pharmacies. Independently sponsored tests lead to a pos-
itive result in fewer cases; when pharmaceutical compa-
nies sponsor the investigation, the number of “positive” 
outcomes increases spectacularly. Through think tanks, 
supporting patient associations, seducing and deploying 
scientists, and by the organization or sponsoring of confer-
ences, working visits and seminars, they defend their inter-
ests. This lobbying work serves to place certain disorders 
more prominently on the agenda, to in uence the demand 
for a particular pharmaceutical product, to in uence the 
prescription attitude of physicians, and of course to sell 
more branded medicines.
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Brie y, the regulatory frameworks for tobacco (nicotine), alco-
hol and medicines can o er a lot of inspiration for a debate about 
the regulation of cannabis. At the same time, these models teach 
us a lot about the pernicious consequences of “commercialization” 
(a model in which pro t maximization for producers is the major 
motive).
In the course of the past decades, cannabis has also been sub-
jected to experiments concerning decriminalization and regulation 
that have been prepared and conducted on the national, regional 
and local level: The co eeshop model in the Netherlands, and the can-
nabis social clubs in Spain and Belgium. Many countries have intro-
duced some kind of variant of the so-called Alaska model: a system 
in which individual citizens or households have the right to grow a 
maximum amount of plants by themselves (in other words: a legal-
ization of small-scale home growing). The models of decriminal-
ization of 25 countries are described in the 2016 report “A quiet rev-
olution: drug decriminalization across the globe” (including Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Estonia, 
Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Croatia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, 
Russia, Spain, Czech Republic and Switzerland).
In 2001, Portugal decided to remove the possession for personal 
use of all illegal drugs from the criminal law and to classify it un-
der administrative law. Someone who is found in the possession of 
a small amount of drugs has to check in with a multidisciplinary 
compound board, some kind of a deterrence commission, in ac-
cordance with the new regulation. A majority of the population in 
the American states of Alaska, Colorado, Oregon and Washington 
voted, in a referendum, in favor of a regulation of the cultivation, 
delivery and sale of cannabis. Canada announced that it will reg-
ulate cannabis in 2018. Furthermore, there are 25 American states 
that introduced medical marijuana programs in the course of the 
past 15 years. Other countries also have a legally-regulated model 
for medicinal cannabis (including Canada, Chile, Finland, Great 
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Britain, Israel, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Czech Republic). 
Uruguay (a country that also signed the international treaties!) 
was the  rst in the world to regulate the entire production chain 
of marijuana in 2014. Each one of these regulatory experiments 
and systems can teach us a thing or two for future experiments 
concerning the legalization of cannabis.
We can learn from the mistakes concerning alcohol and to-
bacco control, and from the experiments with decriminalization or 
regulation of cannabis elsewhere. The current prevalence of alcohol 
and tobacco use is the result of many decades of commercial pro-
motion, often in barely-regulated markets. Considering the fact that 
cannabis still is illegal, we can proceed from a tabula rasa. We can 
start from the beginning by setting up optimal regulatory frame-
works, in which all aspects of the market will be controlled. The 
experiments with the regulation of cannabis in foreign countries 
illustrate that the cannabis market does not have to function on the 
basis of commercial principles. There are other options, whereby 
public bodies or nonpro t organizations are managing the drug 
chain in a way to get rid of the  nancial incentives that initiate or 
stimulate drug use.
2.6. There’s a Hefty Price to Pay 
Opponents of a regulated cannabis market often argue that reg-
ulation would be too expensive, both in terms of application of 
the new legislation and in terms of health costs as a result of the 
increase in cannabis use. Of course there will be costs bound up 
with the change to a regulation model, but they will be particu-
larly small in comparison with the costs of enforcing the cannabis 
ban. Regulation not only saves a lot of money by no longer waging 
a useless and counterproductive drug war, but it also allows the 
generation of revenue by means of taxes (see Chapter 5). Under 
a cannabis ban, the limited present resources will be spent on 
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counterproductive enforcement of the drug laws, to the detriment 
of expenditure upon proven health interventions. All income gen-
erated by legally-regulated cannabis sales can support health inter-
ventions, such as drug prevention, treatment and harm reduction 
initiatives. Even if cannabis use increases, the health damage and 
 nancial costs will decrease, and this generates a net pro t for the 
society on the whole.
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CH A P T ER  3
A Regulated Nonprofit Model for Cannabis
In this chapter, I present a detailed model for a non-pro t-driven cannabis market. It is a hypothetical scenario, which means it does 
not re ect the actual cannabis policy in Belgium, the country where 
I live and work, at all. It is also important to note that the model can 
be considered as “work in progress”. If authorities decide to reject 
prohibition, and to take the path of a regulated cannabis market, 
the scenario presented here de nitely needs re nement (more de-
tailed regulatory regimes) and adaption to the local context.
I  rst point at the necessity of a preparatory phase as part of the 
implementation of the new model. I have repeatedly argued in the 
previous chapters that reforming a cannabis policy implies looking 
for a delicate balance between the (urgent) implementation of a new 
policy and the risks of an overhastily introduced policy. This is why 
I argue for a cautious scenario, in which initially three channels for 
cannabis supply are created: the cultivation and possession of can-
nabis for strict personal use (“home growing”), the cannabis social 
clubs, and the supply of medicinal cannabis to particular groups of 
patients, for medical use only.
1. Preparatory Phase 
I already emphasized in Chapter 2 that the implementation of a 
regulated cannabis model should be implemented cautiously and 
not necessarily in a hasty manner. There should be a preparatory 
36 T o m  D e c o r t e
phase before the whole implementation process, in which: (1) the 
whole scenario is worked out in detail; (2) an information campaign 
is launched, through which citizens are fully informed about the 
objectives and modalities concerning regulation; (3) preparatory 
scienti c research is conducted if necessary.
The further elaboration of detailed regulation takes time and requires 
the input of  eld experts and drug experts from many disciplines. 
The model I propose in this book can undoubtedly be polished and 
re ned. From a pragmatic and political point of view, it is important 
to su  ciently think about the restrictions that have to be built in, and 
about the necessary preconditions before the implementation of a new 
policy model. If the initial governmental regulations are insu  ciently 
restrictive and allow for the production of risky products by the mech-
anism of the free market (and thus by the principle of pro t maximi-
zation), then the retroactive introduction of more restrictive controls 
is a di  cult matter. That is an important lesson from the experiences 
with alcohol and tobacco. Both the alcohol and tobacco industries have 
always  rmly resisted measures aimed at supply reduction.
An adage in communication studies states that if political ac-
tors formulate a policy, they should provide complete, timely, actual 
and consistent information. If this is not the case, every citizen will 
interpret the policy in his or her own way. The possibility that the 
policy objectives will not be realized is much bigger in that case. If 
authorities communicate in a clumsy way about a cannabis policy 
reform, this may lead to great confusion about what will be legal 
and what will remain illegal among young people and among rel-
evant actors in the  eld (police o  cers, magistrates, educators and 
teachers, social workers and so on).
It is very important to set up a solid and well-considered education 
campaign before the actual implementation of a new regulatory 
framework. The government must explain in a comprehensible 
and well-substantiated way what the underlying ideas of the new 
policy are, what the major principles of the new system are (so also: 
37R e g u l a t i n g  C a n n a b i s
what is legally allowed and what not!), what the role will be of the 
various actors and what rules will be applied in the transitional 
phase to the implementation (between the announcement and the 
actual implementation). In doing so, the government avoids great 
confusion amongst cannabis users and the major actors in the  eld.
It is also not unthinkable that authorities need to order addi-
tional scienti c studies in order to profoundly dig out certain aspects 
of the regulated model. I think about, for example, the elabora-
tion of a numerical scale in which the potency and the THC/CBD 
ratios of di erent cannabis products are indicated (see Section 
2.2.8), a study of the most advisable price- xing of di erent can-
nabis products and the related tax measures (on the basis of the 
experience with price- xing and the tax policy concerning tobacco 
and alcohol products) or a study of the advantages and risks of 
vaporizer-appliances and e-joint devices and the labelling and stan-
dardizing of these devices.
2. A Legally Regulated Cannabis Model 
Let us now turn to the proposed scenario itself. I propose a model, 
with three legally regulated channels : (1) home growing for strict per-
sonal use; (2) cannabis social clubs; and (3) supply of medicinal cannabis
(see  gure 3). After a serious evaluation of the implementation of 
the model and its e ects on numerous parameters, the model can 
be adjusted if necessary (see Chapter 4).
Figure 3: Three Regulated Channels for Cannabis Production and Distribution
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2.1. Home Growing for Strict Personal Use 
Regulating the cultivation and possession of cannabis for strict 
personal use is an exceptionally e  cient way to reduce the dangers 
connected with the illegal cannabis market.
In this scenario, every citizen of age is allowed to cultivate a 
limited amount of cannabis for personal use. A citizen is a natural 
person who has a permanent home or address in the country and 
who is registered at an address in a municipality in the country.
The maximum amount of allowed plants for personal use is lim-
ited to six plants per (adult) member of the household, irrespective of 
whether the plants are cultivated inside or outside, and irrespective 
of the maturity of the plants (cuttings, young plants or full-grown 
plants).
One can also decide to have all the plants (up to a maximum 
of six plants) or some of them cultivated by a cannabis social club 
(see Section 2.2). An adult is not allowed to possess more than six 
plants – whether they are cultivated at home or “looked after” by a 
cannabis social club. Residents can choose to cultivate a few plants 
at home (for example 4 plants) and entrust the cultivation of some 
plants (in the same example 2 plants) to a social club.
The grower for strict personal use is allowed to possess an un-
limited amount of cannabis seeds at all times. The sale of cannabis 
seeds is not prohibited. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
of 1961 also states that cannabis seeds are beyond the reach of the 
ban order.
In case of home growing, the used electrical equipment (grow 
lights, carbon  lters, automated irrigation systems, and so on) for 
this purpose should have a quality mark and must be connected 
in a correct and  reproof way. Tapping electricity for the meter is 
considered as theft and should be punished as such.
The grower for strict personal use can possess the proceeds 
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from these plants; in his home in a safe place, which is not accessible 
for minors.
The grower for strict personal use is responsible for the quality 
of the cannabis that he/she produces and consumes. Hints for safe 
growing of high quality cannabis can be made available by cannabis 
social clubs, prevention organizations and by the authorities.
If after some time, indications emerge that the proposed regu-
lation of home growing generates undesirable side e ects (such as 
leakage of home-grown cannabis to the black market or commer-
cial practices), the policy can be adjusted, for example by lowering 
the maximum amount of plants, by  xing a maximum amount of 
cannabis that a grower for strict personal use is allowed to have at 
home, or by limiting the amount of grams that a user is allowed to 
transport or possess in public space.
Selling cultivated cannabis for personal use to a third party is 
considered as a commercial activity and is illegal. If an individual 
is caught, he/she ought to be punished with penalties that are com-
parable with those for illegal drug tra  cking. Selling cannabis to 
minors is an aggravated circumstance.
A number of major limitations and rules are enforced upon 
the use of cannabis and speci c sanctions are imposed on breaking 
them:
• Cannabis use or possession are only allowed for adults;
• Cannabis use is not allowed in public spaces, on the shop  oor 
and in the catering industry, analogous to the smoking ban 
in many countries;
• Youth work centers and youth centers are public spaces: a 
smoking ban is applied (for tobacco and for cannabis);
• Analogous to the local and temporary application of an 
alcohol ban, local authorities, as part of their local case load 
policy, can maintain a temporary “blowing ban” at or around 
certain places, or at particular events;
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• Cannabis can only be sold by licensed distributors (in this 
case the cannabis social clubs, see Section 2.2), and only to 
residents (in order to prevent cannabis tourism).
Other rules should be applied for people who use cannabis for 
medicinal purposes. This will be discussed in Section 2.3.
It is important to note that home growing for strict personal 
use is hard to regulate and its regulation is di  cult to enforce. But 
experience has taught us that home growing creates few signi cant 
challenges. Home growing (“home grown”) is particularly pop-
ular under a ban regime (as we know it nowadays) or in a legally 
regulated regime in which, apart from the cultivation for personal 
use, there are hardly any or no other legally-regulated channels. 
Whether the majority of cannabis users will prefer the convenience 
of legally-available cannabis through cannabis social clubs (see para-
graph “Cannabis social clubs”) or growing the plants themselves, 
depends on various factors. One important condition is a correct 
price- xing of cannabis which is sold through the cannabis social 
clubs: The higher the prices of cannabis products in the clubs, the 
more home growing for personal use is stimulated. A second factor 
is the registration duty in cannabis social clubs. Experiences with 
the introduction of the so-called “weed pass” in the Netherlands (by 
which cannabis consumers were obliged to register at a co eeshop) 
and with the regulated cannabis social clubs in Uruguay reveal that 
many cannabis users – after several decades of repressive policy – 
are suspicious with regard to registration requirements.
2.2. Cannabis Social Clubs 
Cannabis consumers who don’t want to or can’t grow for personal 
use at home, can give the responsibility for taking care of their 
plant(s) to so-called cannabis social clubs. These clubs produce can-
nabis for their members’ personal consumption.
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An inhabitant can decide to have grown some or all plants 
(maximum six) by a cannabis social club (see Section 2.1).
An important challenge is to create safe and controlled envi-
ronments where people can buy or consume cannabis. The avail-
ability of cannabis has to be such that the demand for cannabis can 
be su  ciently met, and that the illegal channels can be reduced. 
At the same time, the availability cannot be too high, given that 
this could lead to an increase in use. Distribution points should not 
encourage the consumption of cannabis.
2.2.1. Legally Required Organization Structure 
Cannabis social clubs are nonpro t organizations that must be 
established and registered as such. The foundation and statutes 
of every cannabis social club must be published in o  cial statute 
books or journals. The statutes of a cannabis association can men-
tion that the societal goal of the association is to produce cannabis 
for their registered members, but of course they cannot include 
objectives that are contrary with public order or accepted principles 
of morality.
Cannabis social clubs have to meet all legal requirements for 
nonpro t organizations: the formulation of detailed statutes with 
the mandatory statutory elements, the mandatory bodies that must 
be established (the board and the general meeting), the members’ 
register, the mentioning of “nonpro t organization” on all doc-
uments, the  scal obligations (including showing the annual ac-
counts) and so on.
In general, those who want to start a nonpro t organization 
have to keep in mind that the organization must have a charitable, 
idealistic and/or sel ess objective and that the “commercial deeds” 
should always be of secondary importance to realizing the main 
objective.
In some countries, the legislator makes a distinction between 
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di erent sizes of nonpro t organizations, and applies di erent ob-
ligations in terms of accountancy. In Belgium for example, the leg-
islator distinguished between small, medium and large nonpro t 
organizations. In my model, cannabis social clubs should only be al-
lowed as small nonpro t organizations. If we would apply the Belgian 
de nition here, that means that they are not allowed to exceed one 
of the following three criteria:
1. an average of  ve full-time employers over the year;
2. receipts of 312,500 euros on an annual basis, exclusive of 
VAT and extraordinary revenues;
3. a balance sheet total of 1,249,500 euros.
A cannabis club has to be established by at least three persons: a 
chairperson, a secretary and a treasurer (the board). The founders 
must be national residents and have to be at least twenty-one years 
old (this means: a permanent home or address in the country and 
registered at an address in a municipality in the country). They 
cannot have any previous convictions for membership of a criminal 
organization, money laundering operations, blackmail or corrup-
tion, nor for serious violent crimes and drug production or distri-
bution on a large scale. As the speci c purpose is to transform the 
existing black market into a legally-regulated cannabis market, a 
previous conviction for growing cannabis is not a su  cient reason 
for exclusion.
To ensure the “not-for-pro t” character of the cannabis clubs, 
we should also carefully think about de ning other restrictions on 
board membership and governance: for example, banning people 
involved in the cannabis industry (or the pharmaceutical, alcohol 
or tobacco industries) from serving as a trustee or o  cer of one of 
these cannabis social clubs.
Before a cannabis social club can start producing and distribut-
ing cannabis products, it has to receive a license from the competent 
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public body that exercises control of the cannabis market and the 
various actors (see Chapter 5). This government service visits the 
location and checks if the club meets all conditions and require-
ments (or can meet them). The government should also clearly 
indicate which sanctions are connected with breaking the di erent 
regulations and rules.
A license as a cannabis social club provides judicial guarantees 
and legal obligations concerning:
• the production (the cultivation);
• the safety and quality of the cannabis products;
• the transport (from the growing locations to the stor-
age space and from the storage space to the distribution 
location);
• the storage;
• the distribution (sale) of cannabis to registered members.
Cannabis social clubs can take on two forms: with and without 
consumption facilities. Cannabis social clubs with consumption facili-
ties have a space where the members can consume cannabis; this is 
not possible in cannabis clubs without consumption facilities. The 
rules for both forms of cannabis social clubs only di er with regard 
to the consumption facilities (cannabis consumption in the club) 
and the additional requirements for the personnel that works there.
With an eye toward obtaining a license, cannabis social clubs 
must submit a complete  le with information regarding:
• all sta  members of the club and their tasks and 
responsibilities;
• all “plant caretakers” of the club;
• The exact locations where cannabis is cultivated;
• The exact locations where cannabis is stored;
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• The exact location where cannabis is distributed amongst 
the members and where cannabis might be used;
• The means by which cannabis is transported from the 
production location(s) to the distribution location, and by 
whom;
• The growing procedures followed by the club and the 
guarantees provided for safe and high quality cannabis 
products.
Limiting the number of cannabis social clubs in a city, munici-
pality or region (in other words: controlling the density of the number 
of clubs in a geographical area) can have counterproductive e ects. 
The experience with Dutch co eeshops taught us that when there 
is limited or no supply, users will make use of illegal channels. If 
a government wants to limit the number of distribution points 
(cannabis social clubs or other), then it should take this mechanism 
into account.
Cannabis social clubs can play a major role in the education of 
users concerning the risks of di erent products, harm reduction, 
responsible use and transferal to specialized drug treatment. Sta  
members have extra responsibilities in cannabis social clubs where 
cannabis is consumed. They must meet additional obligations with 
regard to training in order to deal with people who need help and to 
monitor the (possibly problematic) consumption behavior of the 
members. Sta  members who distribute cannabis, should have – 
by means of such training – an appropriate attitude concerning 
cannabis consumption, on the basis of a sound knowledge about 
the physical and psychosocial e ects of the product. They should 
master the techniques needed to check the identity of people, to 
recognize signs of excessive consumption, and to be able to refuse 
supply of cannabis if necessary. They also have to know the possible 
sanctions when violating the law.
The experience with the alcohol and tobacco sector taught 
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us that pure self-regulation concerning responsible service is not 
enough. Cannabis sellers should strictly apply the rules in the  rst 
place and they should be a source of correct, trustworthy infor-
mation and advice with regard to all sorts of issues, such as safe 
methods of use, the risks of driving under the in uence of cannabis 
and so on. People should be able to  nd help or advice if they are 
worried about their cannabis use. In my view, the same principles 
must also be applied more consistently and strictly to alcohol and 
tobacco sellers.
2.2.2. Nonprofit 
Cannabis social clubs are nonpro t organizations. In order to pre-
vent these organizations from evolving into commercial organiza-
tions over the course of time, a number of speci c restrictions are 
enforced:
• A club can have a maximum of 250 members at any time. 
They can use waiting lists;
• Every form of advertising for the organization, promotion 
of cannabis use or aggressive recruitment of members is 
not allowed (see Section 2.2.3);
• A club can “take care of ” a maximum number of 1500 plants 
(250 members x maximum six plants) at any one time.
The restriction with regard to the maximum number of mem-
bers comes from the experience with some cannabis social clubs in 
Spain. Such clubs have been operating in a grey legal zone and are 
not regulated to this day. This led to the creation of cannabis clubs 
with thousands of members with merely commercial purposes. 
Limiting the number of members can prevent cannabis clubs from 
changing into purely commercial organizations.
Jonathan Caulkins, a drug policy expert at Carnegie Mellon 
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University in Pittsburgh, argued that “what society should want is 
to undercut the black market without promoting greater problem 
use. For-pro t companies do the former, but not the latter. Not-for-
pro ts are more likely to respect these twin aims, particularly if 
the law requires them to write that dual mission explicitly into 
their charter before obtaining a license to operate in the cannabis 
market”.
Another colleague and friend of mine, dr. Chris Wilkins from 
Massey University (New Zealand), recently proposed a “not-for-
pro t” regulatory model for legal recreational cannabis based on 
the regulation of gaming machine gambling in his own country. 
He carefully thought about how excess revenue by the licensed 
“not-for-pro t” cannabis societies in his model should be redis-
tributed to serve the public good. In his model, cannabis societ-
ies should be required to distribute a minimum 20% of the gross 
revenue from cannabis sales to publicly available local drug treat-
ment services, with a further 20% given to authorized community 
purposes including drug prevention, community health services 
and sports and cultural groups. Cannabis societies would also be 
required to transfer 5% of gross cannabis sales to cannabis research 
and evaluation. A further 5% of gross cannabis sales would be 
allocated to the cannabis regulatory agency to support auditing 
and enforcement activity. Underfunding of the regulator can be 
a weakness of the model, as it can result in limited enforcement 
activity. It is important that the regulator be su  cient resourced 
to fully investigate and prosecute fraudulent behavior. Under the 
regime proposed by Chris Wilkins, the government would receive 
20% of the money from gross cannabis sales for licensing and levies 
to support the funding of public services to address the wider health 
and social impacts of cannabis use, such as additional health and 
social services. The cannabis societies would retain approximately 
30% of gross sales revenues to cover their operating costs.
To ensure that the money from cannabis sales goes back to 
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local communities, Wilkins proposes that eighty percent of the 
community grants from cannabis sales would be required to be 
spent in the region where they are collected.
2.2.3. No Promotion 
In the last few years, it has been scienti cally proven that alco-
hol marketing – both the traditional forms of direct marketing 
in print and TV media, and indirect marketing through internet, 
new social media and mobile telephony – has an impact on drink-
ing. Advertising increases the chances that a proportion of young 
people will start to drink, or there is a chance – if they are already 
drinking – that they will drink more. Alcohol advertising not only 
in uences the individual’s consumption but also the social norms 
around alcohol. This in turn in uences again the attitude towards 
alcohol. The more young people think that drinking alcohol is 
widely accepted, the greater the chance that they will start to drink 
and continue to drink more and more. The same goes for cannabis 
and other substances; and that is why we must enforce restrictions 
concerning advertising or promotion.
A large variety of volume and content restrictions to regulated 
alcohol marketing exists throughout the world. These regulations 
can be embedded by law (legislation or statutory regulations), by 
voluntary codes (self-regulation or non-statutory regulations), or 
by a combination of the two (co-regulation). Although these exist-
ing regulations show a large variety of both content and volume 
restrictions, many elements can broadly speaking be applied to the 
cannabis social clubs in this scenario as well.
Cannabis social clubs are consequently not allowed to advertise 
their products through direct or indirect channels or to promote cannabis 
use. This means that they cannot develop or sell merchandising, 
that they can’t apply direct marketing strategies by mail or apps, 
and that the information on their website:
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• Must not link up connections between cannabis use and 
an improvement of physical performances or motorized 
driving;
• Must not give the impression that cannabis use contributes 
to social or sexual success;
• Should not encourage excessive cannabis use nor put absti-
nence or moderate cannabis use in a bad light;
• Must not emphasize the high THC-percentage of cannabis 
products as a good quality;
• Must not represent cannabis products as a means for con-
quering dangerous situations;
• Should not suggest that cannabis products are a necessary 
condition to make daily life more happy nor to create a 
festive atmosphere;
• Has to provide an educational, harm reductive message 
(“Use your head while using cannabis”);
• Should not focus on minors and especially must not show 
any minors using cannabis;
• Should not use any drawings or marketing techniques that 
refer to personalities that are particularly popular or are 
quite the thing with minors, nor drawings or marketing 
techniques in which images or statements are included that 
belong to the mainstream culture of minors.
Cannabis social clubs are not allowed to advertise for cannabis 
products (or other narcotics, such as tobacco or alcohol) in their 
rooms.
2.2.4. Membership Criteria 
Residents must be at least eighteen years old to become a member of a 
cannabis social club. Members have to be national residents in order 
to prevent a pull factor for cannabis entrepreneurs and consumers 
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and export to foreign countries (cannabis tourism from the neigh-
boring countries). They must have a permanent home or address 
in the country and have to be registered in a municipality. Citizens 
can only be a member of one club in order to prevent the cannabis 
shopping of people between di erent clubs. On the basis of the 
member registers (see Section 2.2.13), the supervisory government 
can verify if people try to join several clubs.
If someone registers at a cannabis social club, he/she has to  ll 
in a registration form, in which he/she states:
• That he/she is informed about the risks and negative e ects of 
cannabis on health. The cannabis social clubs are responsible 
for a complete and a correct supply of information concern-
ing this; it is advisable that they join a formal collaboration 
with an authorized organization that is specialized in drug 
prevention or treatment.
• That he/she has knowledge about of the current national drug 
legislation. This includes that he/she knows that distrib-
uting cannabis outside the legally regulated channels is 
punishable, as well as passing on or reselling cannabis that 
he/she acquires at the club, to others (including minors). 
The cannabis social clubs are responsible for a complete 
and a correct supply of information concerning this; they 
can formally collaborate with local police forces.
• That he/she voluntarily joins a cannabis social club.
• That he/she knows about the house rules of the cannabis social 
club and the possible sanctions when breaking them.
• That he/she agrees with the registration of a number of ba-
sic sociodemographic and identity data. The cannabis clubs 
should protect and keep these data in conformity with the 
prevailing privacy legislation and must be able to supply it if 
required by the police or inspection services. They cannot 
and should not share or pass on these data to a third party 
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(such as employers, insurance companies, national health 
services and so on).
• That he/she agrees with an intake interview with regard to 
his/her personal cannabis consumption pattern before regis-
tration at the club, and with a continuous registration of the 
amount of cannabis that he/she obtains through the can-
nabis club. The cannabis clubs have to protect and keep 
these data in conformity with the privacy legislation and 
must be able to supply it if required by the police or inspec-
tion services. They cannot share or pass on these data to a 
third party. The cannabis social clubs can, on the basis of 
these data and with an assumption of “problematic use”, 
voluntarily give advice to their members or refer the peo-
ple concerned to the specialized organizations for drug 
prevention or treatment. These data can also – but only 
anonymously – be used for scienti c research, for exam-
ple as part of evaluation studies of the regulated cannabis 
model (see Chapter 4).
2.2.5. Production of Cannabis by Clubs 
Cannabis social clubs or people who work for them are not actu-
ally the “owners” of the plants they cultivate; they “take care” of the 
plants of their members. These members remain the owners of their 
personal plants at any time. The club employs “plant caretakers” 
(growers) who cultivate and take care of the plants on behalf of the 
members (see Section 2.2.7).
A cannabis social club is never allowed to take care of more 
than six plants per registered member. It must always be clear 
which members possess which plants during the whole produc-
tion and distribution process. This has to be done by means of a 
watertight registration system and a unique identi cation system 
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(a unique barcode per member attached to the plants and the  nal 
cannabis products) throughout the whole process (from seed to 
harvested cannabis).
The cannabis plants should be cultivated according to grow-
ing procedures that o er the most guarantees for public health. 
Concretely, this means that cultivation must be undertaken accord-
ing to the rules and regulations of organic farming, and thus only biolog-
ical additives (such as nutrients or pesticides) can be used. The strict 
regulations with regard to the use of herbicides or Plant Growth 
Regulators (PGRs), the use of fertilizers and of genetically-modi ed 
organisms that are enforced upon organic farming, must be applied 
here. The government can enforce additional regulations on the 
basis of advancing scienti c understandings.
The cannabis social club should establish the growing proce-
dures followed in a protocol that has to be respected by all “plant 
caretakers”, under penalty of exclusion of the club. The club itself is 
responsible for regular inspections of the growing locations and for 
checking the procedures followed by the plant caretakers. Agencies 
responsible for the safety of food products regularly inspect food 
producers and catering businesses. This is also the case for the 
supervisory authority that will have to supervise periodically in 
order to check if, and to what extent, the cannabis clubs stick to 
the regulations.
2.2.6. Technical Design of the Growing Location 
The plants should be cultivated in a non-publicly accessible, closed 
and discretely-designed location. The speci c number of plants per 
growing location has to be decided in consultation with the canna-
bis club. The club must take appropriate measures to su  ciently 
protect the growing location(s) against theft. Every plant should 
have a proof of ownership of a registered club member.
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A growing location is allowed to have a maximum of 1.500 
plants.
The growing location can only be accessed by the plant caretak-
er(s) and the employers of the cannabis social club. The location has 
to be  reproof (electrical ballasts,  re extinguisher or blanket, smoke 
detector if necessary), odorless (carbon  lter, hermetical space) and 
it should not cause any noise or smell nuisance (suction in a “soft box” 
or silencer) or other inconveniences for the neighbors.
Power supply must be installed in a correct and legal way. The 
license will be suspended immediately in case of violations (theft 
of electricity).
2.2.7. Demands on Plant “Caretakers” 
The plant caretakers must be national residents of at least twenty-one 
years old (with a permanent address or residence in the country and 
must be registered in a municipality). They cannot have any previous 
convictions for membership of a criminal organization, money laun-
dering operations, blackmail or corruption, nor for serious violent 
crimes and drug production or distribution on a large scale. As the 
speci c purpose is to transform the existing black market into a le-
gally regulated cannabis market, a previous conviction for growing 
cannabis is not a su  cient reason for exclusion.
Plant caretakers must be a registered member of the club and 
consequently cannot be a member of more than one club. Plant 
caretakers cannot be employed by more than one club.
Plant caretakers have – like every adult resident in the coun-
try – the right to cultivate a maximum of six plants for personal 
use in their own house. They must be able to indicate which plants 
are for personal use and which plants are on behalf of the cannabis 
social club.
The cannabis social club concludes a contract with the plant 
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caretakers in which the concrete rights and duties of both parties 
are stated, including with regard to:
• the enforced minimum requirements of the government 
concerning growing procedures and design of the growing 
location;
• the enforced additional requirements of the club concern-
ing growing procedures and design of the growing location;
• the exclusive character of the relation between the plant 
caretaker and the club (a plant caretaker is allowed to only 
work for one club);
• following the agreed production volumes (the maximum 
number of plants per cultivation, among other things);
• the liability of both parties towards the members of the 
club in case of crop failure, theft or damage to plants;
• the obligations concerning quality control of the produced 
cannabis;
• the liability of both parties towards any interested party 
(the government, the members of the club) in case of not 
respecting the minimum quality norms of the cannabis 
products;
• the agreements concerning reimbursement of the expenses 
of the plant caretaker (for example rent for the growing 
location, purchase of cultivation equipment and so on), as 
well as the honorarium of the plant caretaker;
• the required registration and administration for the plant 
caretaker.
2.2.8. Cannabis Products and Preparations 
Cannabis exists in di erent kinds of preparations:
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• Marijuana consists of dried, crushed leaves and buds. It 
looks like  ne to coarse tea and is grey-green to green-
brown in color. There are a lot of cannabis varieties avail-
able, di ering a lot in quality and in THC and CBD con-
tent (from less strong to very strong cannabis varieties). 
Marijuana can be smoked (whether with tobacco or not), 
vaporized, eaten (mostly processed in food or drinks) or 
processed into a whole range of other products (see below). 
THC is the abbreviation of tetrahydrocannabinol, the phar-
macologically active substance. CBD is the abbreviation of 
cannabidiol.
• Hash (or hashish) is created by pressing the resin of the buds 
together in a small block. These blocks are colored from 
light brown to black. Hash usually contains more THC 
than marijuana, but the purity and the resin potency dif-
fer. Hash can be smoked in a pipe, smoked with tobacco 
or other herb products in a joint (a hand-rolled cannabis 
cigarette), vaporized, eaten or processed in food.
• Hash oil feels a bit sticky and is acquired through alco-
holic distillation of cannabis. In addition to this, there are 
other concentrates – de nitely the ones that are obtained by 
the most recent hi-tech extraction methods – that can be 
very strong. Some even contain more than 80% THC. For 
example butane hash oil (BHO), which is made with the 
extraction substance butane, is a very strong cannabis con-
centrate that is sometimes used in a process that is called 
“dabbing”: at which the user drips the concentrate on a hot 
surface and inhales the vapors.
• Cannabis edibles: Marijuana is edible in its raw form, but 
it happens more often that the active ingredients are dis-
solved in oil or butter and used in countless prepared food 
products (cakes, brownies, cookies, lollipops and so on). A 
lot of drinks are also infused with cannabis oil or tinctures.
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• Other cannabis preparations: In recent years, a lot of new 
preparations were developed for the purpose of medicinal 
cannabis use: sprays, tinctures, sublingual tablets or strips, 
all sorts of tea, tonic drinks and soft drinks that often con-
tain cannabis tinctures of variable strength. In Colorado, 
shrewd businessmen have made use of the minimally regu-
lated cannabis market in order to develop cannabis sweets, 
lollipops, shampoos and so on.
The risks of cannabis use are both connected with the nature of 
the cannabis preparations (and the potency of these products) and 
the method of use. Cannabis products can be used in di erent ways:
• The most common means of consumption is smoking can-
nabis, either in a sort of pipe, in a joint that only contains 
cannabis, or in which marijuana or hash is mixed with 
tobacco. Smoking cannabis is a popular method of use, 
because it’s easy and not expensive. The e ect of the prod-
uct is quickly felt and allows the user to easily control the 
dose. Preparing and sharing a joint is also a social, shared 
experience to many. Burning cannabis (and everything 
with which it is mixed) results of course in the creation of 
all sorts of combustion products, such as tar (with carcino-
genic benzene among other things) and carbon monoxide. 
Inhaling the smoke increases the health risks for the throat 
and lungs. Furthermore, smoking joints in which tobacco 
and cannabis are mixed increases the risks of long-term 
nicotine addiction.
• The active ingredients of cannabis can also be released and 
inhaled in the form of a water vapor, so that the most toxic 
components of the smoke are avoided when burning can-
nabis in pipes or joints. This happens because of the use of 
a vaporizer: A device that heats cannabis to a temperature 
56 T o m  D e c o r t e
that is high enough to set free the volatile cannabinoids as 
a vapor, but not high enough to have the cannabis burned. 
Research into vaporizers and e-cigarettes demonstrates 
that vaporizing cannabis or nicotine decreases the respira-
tory symptoms and the risks of smoking. Nevertheless, re-
search is necessary concerning these devices and the long-
term consequences of this method of use. The devices, for 
that matter, are not su  ciently standardized and approved.
• Cannabis is also edible (in all sorts of food preparations), 
by which the active ingredients are absorbed through the 
stomach and the digestive system. In contrast with smok-
ing or inhaling the vapor, the e ects of cannabis occur later 
(from twenty minutes to one hour, dependent on the kind 
of food and if you had eaten before that). Eating cannabis is 
much safer with regard to the damaging consequences for 
the throat and lungs (since there are none), but then again 
the consumer has much less control over the dose he/she 
takes. If consequently a cannabis consumer does not wait 
long enough to see which e ect the cannabis produces, he/
she runs the risk of consuming too much cannabis too fast 
(with possible negative or unpleasant consequences).
We have to keep in mind some important conclusions with 
regard to the nature of the connection between the risks and the 
kind of cannabis products and/or the method of use of cannabis:
• There is a clear relation between the dose and the risks of 
cannabis: the more a person uses, the greater the risks;
• The risks are in uenced by the knowledge of the user (about 
the di erent cannabis products, the di erent methods of 
use and the risks) and the extent to which the user can 
control the dose;
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• The quickness by which the e ects are produced, varies 
with the method of use and the impact on the nature of 
the experience and the extent to which the user can control 
the dose;
• The health consequences for the lungs that are linked with 
smoking cannabis are comparable with those of smoking 
tobacco. After all, smoking is a burning process (called py-
rolysis) and whatever an individual smokes, this is always 
unhealthy, so detrimental substances are formed that are 
left behind as a form of tar in his/her lungs. When cannabis 
is not mixed with tobacco, one could substantiate that the 
dependency towards the product decreases. After all, both 
THC (the active element of cannabis) and nicotine (the 
active element of tobacco) increase the chances of depen-
dence, especially psychological. On the other hand, we have 
to emphasize that the health consequences for the lungs are 
signi cantly reduced when inhaling vaporized cannabis 
instead of cannabis smoke. This is also the case with the 
consumption of edible cannabis preparations. Smoking is 
unhealthy, without any exception, because there is a causal 
connection with lung cancer (among other things) due to 
the tar formed during the burning process.
A regulated market has to keep in mind the above-mentioned 
points, and a diversi ed regulation of di erent kinds of cannabis 
products (and the way they are used) must serve to in uence con-
sumer patterns in the best possible way, so that the safest products 
and the safest methods are used.
As I advocate a strictly-regulated cannabis market, I propose 
the following principles:
• Cannabis social clubs can only produce a limited range of 
marijuana and hash products (of low, medium and high 
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potency) and distribute these amongst their members. 
They are not allowed to o er or sell any other concentrated 
preparations such as cannabis oil, tinctures or food infused 
with cannabis. Users that want edible cannabis products 
can easily produce these products at home, for that matter;
• Cannabis social clubs are not allowed to o er pre-rolled 
joints (in which cannabis and tobacco is mixed);
• Cannabis products must meet the requirements that are 
dictated to organically grown agricultural products; they 
should not contain any chemical-synthetic aromatic sub-
stances, colorings and  avorings or preservatives;
• Cannabis social clubs are responsible for promoting the least 
harmful methods of use, by only allowing the use of vaporiz-
ers in the rooms of the club (and not smoking cannabis in 
“ joints” or pipes) among other things;
• The clubs are also responsible for supplying adequate prod-
uct information and promoting harm reductive strategies 
in the club (through the mandatory instruction lea et with 
the cannabis they distribute);
• As soon as vaporizer devices will be controlled and ap-
proved by the government (for example with a quality la-
bel), clubs could also o er these delivery tools.
2.2.9. Requirements with regard to Quality and Potency of the Cannabis Products 
In a regulated cannabis market, the potency of the cannabis prod-
ucts has to be controlled and should be monitored in a reliable and 
consistent way. It should be ensured that consumers are informed 
accurately about the potency of the products they consume, about 
the potential e ects and risks and about the ways in which they can 
reduce the risks. Finally, minimizing the potential risks of extraor-
dinary strong cannabis products should be an important objective.
59R e g u l a t i n g  C a n n a b i s
Setting up a maximum limit concerning THC in cannabis prod-
ucts is, because of various reasons, not obvious and exceptionally 
hard to enforce, but nevertheless I suggest some limits are imposed 
(see  gure 4).
* Including the precursor of THC, known as THCQ (this is tetrahydrocannabinolic acid and is converted 
to THC by smoking or drying the plant)
Figure 4: Hypothetical Maximum THC and CBD Levels in Marijuana and Hash
There must be regular tests of cannabis products that are dis-
tributed by the cannabis social clubs; this should happen by 
taking unannounced, randomized samples by an independent 
organ or laboratory appointed by the government. The intensity 
of the necessary quality tests will depend, after a while, on the 
extent to which the clubs have stuck to the required limits, but 
the control should be intensive when implementing the regu-
lated system.
The production and especially the distribution of cannabis 
products that signi cantly di er from the potency that is indicated 
on the packing or the instruction lea et, must be considered as 
serious violations of the license. The government should indicate 
clearly which margins of error are tolerable and what the penalties 
for violations will be (for example which violations will lead to a 
withdrawal of the license for the club).
All cannabis products have to be clearly provided with infor-
mation about their potency, such as the THC and CBD levels. 
This information must be backed up with information about the 
possible risks. I propose a simple numerical scale (from category 1 
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to 3), that indicates the di erent potencies (and THC/CBD levels) 
(see  gure 5).
Figure 5: Hypothetical Numerical Scale with regard to Potency 
of Cannabis Products (THC/CBD Levels)
2.2.10. Requirements Concerning Packing 
Although the risk of accidental consumption of cannabis products 
by children is relatively small (and de facto rarely occurs), the can-
nabis social clubs have to meet certain requirements concerning the 
packing of cannabis (that they distribute to their members). These 
requirements should be de ned by the competent authorities for 
public health, but meanwhile I formulate some proposals:
1. All cannabis products must be sold in non-transparent, re-
sealable and childproof plastic containers, comparable with 
packages that are used for some medicines, household 
products or food. The packing has to be such that rogue 
persons or ignorant children can’t tamper with it (“tamper 
proof ”).
2. The information on the packing must be based on the existing 
norms for medicines and on the lessons from the experi-
ences with packing tobacco products. This means that the 
packing:
61R e g u l a t i n g  C a n n a b i s
• has to provide a clear warning concerning the health 
risks of the product;
• must not include a branding or design, in other words: 
no brand-speci c logos, colors or fonts (“plain pack-
aging”), because these could encourage use or could 
increase the temptation;
• Should provide a clear description of the cannabis prepa-
ration (marijuana or hash);
• must provide clear information about the potency 
of the product: the THC and CBD level (in terms of 
percentages);
• Has to provide clear information about the storage life 
of the product.
3. All cannabis products that are distributed through the can-
nabis social club should be accompanied by an instruction 
lea et that contains the following information:
• major e ects and side e ects (the positive and negative ef-
fects; the e ects of di erent doses; possible di erences in 
e ects by di erent users, depending on the age, experience 
with the product, body weight, and so on);
• general risks (concerning dependency, breathing, men-
tal health; risks for people with predetermined medical 
disorders);
• secondary risks (such as reduced competence for driving a 
car, operating machines or carrying out other professional 
tasks; risks for pregnant women and their unborn child; 
risks with regard to accidental consumption by children);
• Harm reduction: How the risks should be minimized (a de-
scription of safer methods of use and of safer products and 
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preparations, how to moderate use, and the risks of poly 
drug use);
• Contraindications (the risks of cannabis use with alcohol, 
with tobacco, with medicines whether or not prescribed 
and with illegal substances);
• Where to  nd help or advice (contact information and 
website addresses of relevant treatment and prevention 
organizations).
Rules concerning packing and instruction lea ets have to be 
legally established and must be actively enforced through controls 
of the supervisory body (see Chapter 5). Cannabis social clubs 
that do not stick to the regulations may lose their license or can be 
prosecuted, comparable with the way that tobacco producers and 
pharmaceutical companies can be sanctioned.
2.2.11. Storage and Transport of Cannabis 
Cannabis social clubs can temporarily store cannabis products 
(for example between the harvest and the moment of distribution 
amongst the members). Obviously, a club is not allowed to store 
more cannabis than is legally allowed according to the norms con-
cerning the maximum number of members (250 members) and 
plants (maximum six plants per member). If cannabis amounts 
are stored, this must be done in a location con rmed by the gov-
ernment that is not accessible for minors or third parties and su  -
ciently secured against theft. During the storage of cannabis, the 
club must also be able to indicate who the owners (the members) 
of the cannabis are, and which amount belongs to which registered 
member.
Clubs can only transport their products between predeter-
mined growing locations, storage locations and the location where 
cannabis is distributed amongst the members. A club is not allowed 
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to transport more cannabis than is legally allowed according to 
the norms concerning the maximum number of members and 
plants. Cannabis products must be transported in a neutral car 
(without promotion), in a safe way and su  ciently secured against 
theft. During the transport of cannabis, the club always must be 
able to present the necessary documents con rming the fact it is a 
legally-licensed cannabis club. It should also be able to indicate who 
the plant owners (the members) are and which amount belongs to 
which registered member.
2.2.12. Distribution 
Clubs can only distribute self-produced products, given that they 
work on the basis of the principle that the members have entrusted 
the maintenance of their plant(s) to the cannabis clubs. In the  rst 
instance (the  rst phase), these organizations are not allowed to 
import cannabis products from other countries or purchase them 
through other (illegal) channels.
The distribution of cannabis products by cannabis social clubs 
can happen in two ways: (1) by means of “exchange marts” at regular 
times; (2) by continuous sale during opening hours.
Cannabis social clubs that apply the principle of the exchange 
marts organize events on a regular basis when the members can 
collect their own cannabis. Cannabis social clubs can also apply a 
system of opening hours, by which the members can pick up small 
amounts of cannabis.
There is very consistent evidence concerning alcohol regu-
lation that limiting the number of opening days and hours is an 
e ective means to reduce alcohol-related damage. Consequently, I 
believe we need to enforce some restrictions upon cannabis social 
clubs, but in a balanced way, in order that there is a su  cient supply 
of cannabis (and people don’t have to supply again by way of the 
black market).
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Anyhow, the clubs and the members are restricted to a maximum 
amount of cannabis per month. This amount must be high enough in 
order to prevent members from making extra purchases on the 
black market. At the same time, the maximum allowed amount of 
cannabis per person should not be too high, so that they won’t resell 
it to a third party. I propose a limit of 60 grams of cannabis per per-
son per month. The clubs are responsible for a correct registration 
of the quantities that is collected by every member every month.
Clubs that distribute more cannabis to their members than is 
legally allowed, risk the loss of their license and in serious cases 
prosecution for illegal trade in cannabis. Members of clubs that are 
caught reselling cannabis to a third party (especially minors), also 
risk being prosecuted for illegal drug dealing.
Cannabis social clubs that allow consumption of cannabis in 
the club have to ful l some additional conditions:
• Given their extra responsibilities with regard to recog-
nizing signs of excessive consumption, and with regard 
to refusing cannabis to some members if necessary, the 
sta  members have to meet extra requirements concerning 
training;
• The consumption rooms must display correct and clear in-
formation with reference to safer methods of use, the risks 
of cannabis use (in tra  c amongst other things) and the or-
ganizations and centers where users can get help or advice;
• No other drugs can be sold in the consumption rooms: no 
tobacco, no alcohol (and of course no other illegal drugs);
• No display of promotion or advertising for cannabis prod-
ucts is allowed in the consumption room (see Section 
2.2.3).
• The boarding on the street side or the signposting to the 
consumption room should only be functional and not aimed 
on advertising or tempting passers-by. In Washington, the 
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signposting must not include references to cannabis (such 
as the well-known green cannabis leaf), but only the  rm 
or club name.
2.2.13. Transparent Administration and Accounting 
Transparency is necessary for showing both the members and the 
supervisory bodies how, why, by whom, for what and by which 
motives, decisions are taken by the administration. For that pur-
pose, every organization must keep the following documents and 
be able to hand them over to the controlling public servants of the 
supervisory body (See also Chapter 5);
• An up-to-date member register: the membership of a cannabis 
club should go hand in hand with the registration of per-
sonal information. The club is responsible for the protec-
tion of this information according to the legal norms. The 
supervisory bodies are allowed to check and look into this 
information;
• The identi cation documents and the licenses for the plant 
caretakers and other active workers;
• A sale and distribution register: an anonymous register in 
which the produced and distributed quantities are kept up 
to date;
• A transparent and correct accounting: the organization is re-
sponsible for a meticulous administration and a detailed 
accounting that can be checked by the members, by tax 
authorities and by the supervisory body;
• Reports of all member meetings.
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2.3. Supply of Cannabis for Medicinal Purposes 
For many centuries, the cannabis plant has been used in a medicinal 
context for its sedative, sleep-inducing, antidepressant, pain killing, 
anticonvulsive, antiemetic, anti-in ammatory, antispasmodic and 
appetite stimulating qualities. Scienti c literature o ers a lot of 
evidence that cannabis with a high CBD level is e ective against 
pain and spasms, for example in the case of patients with multiple 
sclerosis (MS), and it also seems to be e ective against in amma-
tion. Cannabis with a high level of THC is especially e ective for 
disorders, such as Gilles de la Tourette syndrome, therapy resistant 
glaucoma and for complaints with regard to weight loss, sickness 
and vomiting. For that reason, some cancer patients also use can-
nabis to reduce symptoms or side e ects of their treatment.
2.3.1. Extension of the Legal Availability of Medicinal Cannabis Products 
In some countries, including my own (Belgium), medicinal can-
nabis products are only available under very strict conditions (see 
Chapter 1), and in other countries medicinal cannabis is com-
pletely outlawed. This means medicinal cannabis is not legally 
available for several groups of patients, who consequently turn to 
the illegal market to supply themselves with cannabis. A broader, 
legally-regulated availability of cannabis for medicinal use for speci c 
groups of patients is desirable.
2.3.2. Home Growing for Personal Use for Medical Purposes 
If we presume that home growing for strict personal (recreational) 
use is regulated, then this also means that patients themselves can 
cultivate just as many plants for medicinal purposes. It is advis-
able to point out to the patients as much as possible the risks of 
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consuming cannabis that is not cultivated according to pharma-
ceutical requirements, as its quality and safety are not guaranteed.
As patients that use cannabis for medicinal purposes often need 
larger quantities, an increase of the maximum amount of allowed plants 
for these cases can be taken into consideration. The patient has to 
request a special exemption or license for that, in which the serious 
medical disorder or condition is veri ed with o  cial certi cates 
and in which there must be proof that the attending physician is 
consulted and agrees with the consumption of cannabis for medical 
purposes.
Finally, I want to point out that home growing and harvesting 
of cannabis and preparing cannabis products is just not possible for 
some patients because of their state of health and syndrome. The 
American principle of “caregivers” can be applied in such exceptional 
cases. This principle allows a housemate (a partner, a family mem-
ber) to grow cannabis on behalf of the patient. This person must 
obtain a special license or exemption.
2.3.4. Strict Division Between Recreational and Medicinal Cannabis Channels 
At the same time, I want to emphasize the importance of a strict 
separation between the production and distribution of cannabis
for medical use, and the production and distribution of cannabis for 
recreational use. We should avoid a situation in which cannabis for 
medical purposes leads to illegal markets or to legal markets for 
recreational use. Furthermore, it may never be the intention that 
under the guise of supplying medicinal cannabis, a parallel market 
for recreational cannabis is actually being created, which has been 
the case in some American states. For this reason I also argue for a 
well-de ned qualitative and quantitative composition for medicinal 
cannabis.
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2.3.5. Cannabis Products of Pharmaceutical Quality 
Obviously, when cannabis as a medicine or a medical treatment of 
symptoms is consumed, the product must be of pharmaceutical quality. 
I propose that this form of cannabis has a THC:CBD ratio of 1:1 
and that level of both THC and CBD is 5%. A state can decide to be 
inspired by the Dutch model with regard to medicinal cannabis, in 
which the Bureau Medicinal Cannabis is responsible as a government 
organization for the production of cannabis for medicinal and sci-
enti c purposes. The company Bedrocan is since 2003 the only one 
that has been producing medicinal cannabis for the Dutch Ministry 
of Public Health, Welfare and Sport.
The requirements for the preparation of medicines are legally 
enforced in most countries, and consequently medicinal cannabis 
products should also meet these requirements. No medicine can be 
commercialized without registration or license. In Belgium for exam-
ple, this license is granted by the minister of Public Health, after 
advice from the Medicine commission within the Federal Agency 
for Medicines and Health Products (FAMHP), or the European 
Community, possibly after advice from the Committee for Medicinal 
Products for Human Use or the Committee for Medicinal Products 
for Veterinary Use (CVMP) within the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA). The appointed experts within these di erent bodies evalu-
ate the quality, the control and the e  ciency of all medicines on the basis 
of scienti c data presented by the applicant. During this evaluation, 
they rely on the scienti c norms that are operative on a European 
or international level. The license for distributing a medicine is 
granted to medicines of which the quality, the security and the 
e  ciency are clearly demonstrated.
In Europe, arguments concerning the security and the e  -
ciency of a medicine can be presented to the competent authority 
in di erent ways:
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• By a complete  le: the applicant presents the pharmacolog-
ical, toxicological and clinical studies when applying for a 
license of an original medicine;
• By a generic  le: if an active element is allowed in one mem-
ber state of the European Union for at least ten years, and 
if in addition the patent is expired, the applicant can refer 
to the results of the studies carried out with the original 
medicine (the reference medicine), provided that both are 
“essentially equal;”
• By a bibliographic  le: with reference to published scienti c 
literature which proves that the medicine can be accepted 
concerning its pharmacological, toxicological and clinical 
aspects. This possibility can only be applied if the active 
element has been used as a medicine in medical practice in 
the European Union for at least ten years (“well established 
use”) and moreover is recognized as e ective and safe.
The applicant should demonstrate for every medicine that the 
manufacturer is able to produce a product of su  cient and constant 
quality and there must be guarantees that this quality remains until 
the proposed expiry date. The following aspects of the medicine 
have to be discussed in the submitted  le: the pharmaceutical de-
velopment, the production process, the control of and the stability 
of the active element, the control of the production process and all 
ingredients (including packing) and the control and the stability 
of the medicine. Every modi cation of these elements, after the 
medicine has been launched, has to take place with a license.
Producers of medicines (legal drugs) are subjected to regular 
inspections. In Europe for example, they have to meet the European 
requirements concerning “Good Manufacturing Practices” (GMP) 
and are only allowed to produce medicines if they have a GMP-
certi cate. If they do not meet these requirements, then the GMP-
certi cate will be revoked and the producer concerned cannot 
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produce any more medicines. The controls by the national agency 
(or agencies) for medicines and health products must ensure that ev-
ery resident has access to high-quality, e  cient and safe medicines.
2.3.6. Cannabis Only Available on Prescription 
In my opinion, medicinal cannabis products have to be guided and 
supervised by a doctor and thus must be prescription-only products. 
The e ects of medicinal cannabis di er from person to person. For 
that reason, a doctor has to determine in consultation with the pa-
tient which variety is the most suitable, how much and how many 
times per day he/she needs medicinal cannabis, and how the patient 
uses it. The doctor in attendance also has an eye for interactions of 
medicinal cannabis products with other medicines that a patient 
takes as part of his/her treatment.
2.3.7. Cannabis Supply only through Pharmacies 
Medicinal cannabis supply should only happen via pharmacies. 
Pharmacies are not allowed to supply medicinal cannabis products 
without a medical prescription. The pharmacist must make sure 
that the patient correctly applies his/her treatment. This includes 
for example that he/she explains to the client when and how he/
she should take his/her medicinal cannabis product, that he/she 
warns the client for possible side e ects and that he/she has an eye 
for interactions with other medicines that the client takes.
2.3.8. Medicinal Cannabis Through Cannabis Social Clubs 
Nowadays, there are some cannabis social clubs in Belgium that 
only produce and distribute cannabis for medicinal use. Other clubs 
mainly serve recreational users, but also have some members that 
use it for therapeutic reasons (see Chapter 1).
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On the basis of the two important principles as defended 
above – in particular, the importance of a strict division between 
the cultivation and distribution of cannabis for medical use and the 
cultivation and distribution of cannabis for recreational use on the 
one hand, and the principle that medicinal applications of cannabis 
should happen under the supervision of a doctor in attendance on 
the other hand – I want to argue that the production and distribution 
of cannabis for medicinal purposes by cannabis social clubs should be for-
bidden and only be made possible through the channels mentioned 
above (production by the pharmaceutical industry, subject to the 
requirement of a prescription from a doctor, available through 
pharmacies).
The option in which there are cannabis social clubs that are only 
responsible for the production and distribution of medicinal cannabis, 
is an alternative that requires extra investigation. The cannabis 
products that the clubs supply to patients of course must meet 
all pharmaceutical requirements. Furthermore, extra conditions 
(such as the obligatory formal cooperation with doctors) should be 
enforced. The regulatory framework must be formulated in such 
a way that there are no cannabis social clubs that engage in the 
distribution of medicinal cannabis merely for the money. In my 
opinion, the production and distribution of cannabis for medicinal 
purposes through cannabis clubs that focus on recreational con-
sumers should be forbidden, with an eye toward a strict division 
between medicinal and recreational cannabis.
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CH A P T ER  4
Evaluation and Adjustment
The scenario presented in the previous chapter can be considered a  rst phase in a lengthy process of reform. It is very likely that 
any new cannabis policy will su er from teething problems, and 
lessons will be learnt from its growing pains. That is why I argue 
in this chapter, that the model described previously can and should 
be adjusted after a serious and independent evaluation of the im-
plementation of the model and its e ects on numerous parameters. 
In a second phase, one must verify which parts of the new regu-
latory regime should become less or more rigid, and if it is a wise 
decision to create additional channels for cannabis production and 
distribution, or not.
1. Independent and Scientific Evaluation 
It is especially important to have the implementation of a new can-
nabis policy and its side e ects evaluated by independent scientists. 
Such scienti c evaluation of the whole process and the e ects in 
the short, medium and long term can lead to the adjustment of the 
policy if desired (both concerning the creation of new restrictions 
and government interventions and liberalizing the current rules).
The success of the cannabis ban and the repressive approach 
is always measured by indicators and statistics that rather re ect 
processes or (police) activities, such as the number of arrests, re-
ports or municipal administrative  nes, the number of discovered 
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plantations or the amounts of cannabis con scated, or the penalty. 
Such indicators do show us how much e ort the authorities have 
made or how forcefully they acted, but the stats do not illustrate 
how successful the state is in improving public health.
With an eye to a critical evaluation of the new policy, relevant 
and measurable indicators must be formulated with regard to all as-
pects of the cannabis market and its functioning. These indicators 
should refer to the objectives of a new cannabis policy as listed in 
the introduction.
• Does the new cannabis policy lead to the reduction of ille-
gal channels, the weakening and in the long term the elim-
ination of the black market in cannabis, and the deprivation 
of an important source of income to organized crime and 
their economic power?
• Does the new cannabis policy lead to better control of the 
composition, the purity, the potency and the quality of 
cannabis in general, for the protection of public health?
• Does the new model lead to an improved control of the 
marketing strategies of cannabis producers?
• To what extent do the legal cannabis producers and distrib-
uters stick to the legally-enforced regulations and limita-
tions? To what extent is a relaxing or tightening of certain 
regulations imperative?
• What are the e ects of the new cannabis policy on the 
prevalence of cannabis use and on the patterns of cannabis 
consumption (in particular amongst young people)?
• What are the economic e ects concerning expenses and 
incomes? Does the new model lead to more cost e  ciency 
and investments based on scienti c evidence in e  cient 
prevention, in the reduction of the demand and harm re-
duction, and to fewer expenses in the tracing, prosecution 
and punishment of illegal producers?
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• What are the e ects of the new policy on all sorts of nui-
sance and criminality?
• What are the e ects of the new policy on (the overload of) 
the criminal justice system and the (overpopulation of) the 
penitentiary system?
• What are the e ects with regard to the reduction of pol-
lution as a result of large-scale illegal cannabis production 
(cannabis plantations)?
• What are the e ects of the policy on the role and the tasks 
of prevention workers and social workers and on the acces-
sibility of their target audience?
The answers to all these questions have to be used in order to 
evaluate the new policy and to adjust the regulatory framework in 
the light of new evidence.
2. Adjustment of the Model 
Setting a new course does not happen overnight. It must be phased 
and it should be implemented cautiously, based on experiments, by 
which the policy is carefully adjusted and adapted according to the 
indications that become visible. If a policy does not work, it must 
be reviewed and, if necessary, it should even be revoked.
After a careful evaluation based on the parameters mentioned 
above (see Section 1), it consequently must be veri ed whether and 
to what extent:
• the rules concerning home growing (the maximum num-
ber of allowed plants) should be liberalized or tightened;
• the rules concerning the legally mandatory organization 
structure of cannabis social clubs have to be adjusted;
• the legally provided conditions in order to have a license as 
a cannabis social club must be adjusted;
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• the limitations concerning size and promotion strategies for 
cannabis social clubs ought to be liberalized or tightened;
• the membership criteria (such as the minimum age) should 
be adapted;
• the production capacity and growing procedures for clubs 
must be revised;
• the ban on the import of cannabis products from abroad 
or purchase through other channels must be maintained;
• the requirements set out for the “plant caretakers” ought 
to be liberalized or tightened;
• the allowed range of cannabis products needs to be ex-
tended or restricted;
• requirements concerning quality and potency and con-
cerning the packing of the cannabis products have to be 
adjusted;
• the rules concerning the distribution of cannabis (exchange 
marts, opening hours of clubs, consumption facilities 
within the clubs and so on) should be adjusted.
3. Creating Additional Legal Channels 
It is possible that a state, on the basis of the evaluation of the e ects 
of the new regulated model, decides to investigate the possibilities 
with regard to additional legal channels for cannabis production 
and distribution. This can be the case if it appears that the three 
channels that were regulated in the  rst phase do not su  ce to 
meet the existing demand (and thus there remain too many op-
portunities and pro t margins for illegal producers); or if these 
channels appear to be less attractive for an overly-large group of 
cannabis consumers in comparison with supplying themselves on 
the black market. After all, it is foreseeable that not all cannabis 
users will grow cannabis themselves, and that not all consumers 
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will be prepared to register at a cannabis social club. This can 
also have to do with the observation that existing channels (such 
as home growing for personal use and the cannabis social clubs) 
insu  ciently lead to a higher quality and purity of the available 
cannabis products, for example because the cannabis social clubs 
are insu  ciently able to meet the quality requirements imposed 
by the authorities.
Additional legal channels for cannabis production and distribu-
tion can adopt di erent forms:
• A complete government monopoly, by which commer-
cial players are not allowed to access the legally-regulated 
market;
• A commercial market with a small number (or an unlim-
ited number) of licensed producers and similarly distribu-
tors (or outlets), in which diverse aspects may or may not 
be strictly regulated;
• A regulated model consisting of a mix of commercial and 
government monopolistic elements (in which various as-
pects of the market – production – commercial players are 
allowed and in which other aspects – sales through canna-
bis stores – strictly remain in the hands of the government).
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CH A P T ER  5
General Conditions
When a policy fails to achieve its purposes, a great deal of political, institutional, temporal, and economic capital has been wasted. 
This is one of the lessons we can learn from the failure of the war 
on drugs, and prohibitionist cannabis policies in particular. These 
lessons are necessary ex post observations on the war on drugs, but 
they must also inform any ex ante analysis of the newly proposed 
policy designs, instrument choices, and other policy-making vari-
ables to establish a framework for more e ective cannabis policy 
making. Though policy success may be inhibited by a variety of 
procedural, programmatic, or political factors, I believe a prelim-
inary institutional analysis of the necessary preconditions in the 
earlier stages of the policy cycle can help society avoid constitu-
tionally driven policy failures and move toward institutional policy 
successes. Only when these institutional preconditions are achieved 
will the procedural, programmatic, and political components of a 
new cannabis policy have an opportunity to succeed. That is why 
I address some necessary preconditions for the implementation of 
the scenario presented in the previous chapters in this  nal chapter.
1. Supervisory Bodies 
In preparation for the implementation of a new cannabis policy, the 
government has to set up an independent commission of domestic and 
foreign experts, in order to identify the major issues and to formulate 
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the general recommendations with regard to the new policy. The 
expertise of these experts should relate to many domains: public 
health, drug policy, international and national law, legal cannabis 
production, agriculture, environmental care and monitoring and 
evaluation research. This panel can gradually evolve to a task force
that supervises and formulates recommendations concerning the 
details and the implementation of the new cannabis policy.
As mentioned above, it is extremely important to have evaluated
the implementation of the new cannabis policy and its side e ects 
on a continuous basis by independent scientists. Su  cient resources 
must be provided for monitoring and evaluating the impact and 
must be incorporated in the regulated model from the beginning. 
In the face of a critical evaluation of the new policy, relevant and 
measurable indicators must be established with regard to all aspects 
of the cannabis market and its functioning. These should relate to 
the objectives of the new policy, as listed before. These monitoring 
data should be used to make sure that the policy and the policy 
modi cations are screened regularly in order that there is a certain 
 exibility to adjust strategies in the light of new evidence.
The state must create a supervisory body that grants the licenses 
for cannabis social clubs (and in the longer term other possible 
license holders) and controls the compliance with all regulations. 
Just to clarify what I mean, let me call it the Federal Agency for the 
Regulation and Control on Cannabis (FACC). This organization can 
be an equivalent or can be part of the organizations that supervise 
the rules concerning the production and the sale of tobacco and 
alcohol. Considering the large number of domains on which the 
regulation of cannabis can have an e ect, a new umbrella organ 
should be created, analogous to agencies that supervise the safety 
of the food chain, or of medicines and health products. An Instituto 
de Regulación y Control del Cannabis (IRCA) is also established in 
Uruguay for that purpose.
This supervisory body should pay attention to:
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• the license procedure and the license grant for cannabis 
social clubs;
• compliance with the regulations with regard to production, 
storage and distribution of cannabis products through can-
nabis social clubs;
• compliance with the regulations with regard to quality 
and safety of the legally allowed cannabis products (and 
its packing);
• the registration of the members (and the limitation that 
national (adult) residents are only allowed to join one can-
nabis social club);
• the price policy concerning cannabis products;
•  …
2. Clear and Proportionate Sanction System 
In the scenario for a regulated cannabis market I propose here, ad-
ministrative or criminal sanctions for the production, supply and 
possession of cannabis that take place within the parameters of the 
legal framework, are abolished. However, all activities that take 
place outside the legal framework (for example the sale of cannabis 
to minors and the production and distribution by non-licensed 
individuals or organizations) remain punishable. The government 
should also provide a clear and proportionate sanction system for pro-
ducers, distributors or users that do not adhere to the rules: in par-
ticular the regulations concerning the maximum allowed amounts 
and allowed cannabis products, the requirements concerning qual-
ity and potency of cannabis, the regulations with regard to the 
packing and the instruction lea et, the ban on advertising, mar-
keting and branding and so on. The imposed sanctions can di er 
according to the severity of the violation: administrative  nes, 
revoking of the license, or criminal sanctions.
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3. Convergence of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Cannabis Policy 
In recent years, various reforms were introduced regarding the 
regulation of alcohol and tobacco in many countries. These were 
usually aimed at minimizing the less regulated and purely com-
mercial market with more restrictions (see  gure 2 in Chapter 1). 
Therefore, the regulatory models for both drugs moved to the mid-
dle between the two extreme options, with on the one hand a total 
ban (with a complete black market) and on the other hand a free, 
unregulated and purely commercial market. The scenario for the 
regulation of cannabis I propose here also aims for a legally strictly 
regulated market model. It is important to apply the same principles, 
based on scienti c evidence about public health and harm reduction, to 
all drugs and to develop for every drug the most suitable regulation model. 
Nowadays, there are many inconsistencies in the way that alcohol 
and tobacco on the one hand, and cannabis on the other hand, are 
regulated. It should be the objective to bring the regulation of these 
products more fully into convergence. The continuous process to 
develop an e ective regulatory model for cannabis goes hand in 
hand with the improvement of the regulatory models for alcohol 
and tobacco.
4. Price Policy and Taxation on Cannabis Products 
There is no doubt that a regulated market has an impact on the 
prices of cannabis products. A big challenge is estimating the pos-
sible e ects of changes in the prices, the way price control mech-
anisms will in uence the prevalence and the patterns of cannabis 
use and which e ects they will have on the legal and illegal can-
nabis markets. Determining the most suitable interventions with 
regard to price control has to do with seeking a balance between 
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con icting priorities, such as discouraging cannabis use and reduc-
ing the size of the illegal cannabis markets.
What are the expected e ects of a regulation of the cannabis 
market on the price of cannabis? The regulation of the cannabis 
market goes hand in hand with legalizing (decriminalizing) canna-
bis production and distribution. We may expect that this will lower 
the price of cannabis. The main reason is that when the production 
and the distribution of cannabis are taken out of the criminal envi-
ronment, the risk premium will decline. This means the following. 
Because of the fact that today the production and distribution of 
cannabis are illegal, the producers and distributors of cannabis take 
a risk if they practice these activities. They can get caught, their 
investments can be forfeited and they can be imprisoned. Thus, 
they will only want to practice these activities if they receive a suf-
 ciently high compensation for that risk. This is the risk premium. 
This actually works as an additional production cost and raises the 
price of cannabis. From the moment that the cannabis market will 
be legalized and regulated, this risk premium will disappear for the 
most part and the price of cannabis will go down.
The importance of this price reduction is theoretically hard 
to determine. It depends amongst other things on the deterrent 
character of the current repressive system. If the repression is very 
radical, then the risk premium is high and the price will be able to 
decrease signi cantly after the legalization. The reverse is of course 
the case if there is a tolerance policy. In that case, the risk premium 
won’t be able to decrease markedly, because it is already low.
The main problem of regulation and legalization has to do with 
the question if, and to what extent, the price reduction of cannabis 
will increase its consumption. The fear that cannabis consumption 
will be stimulated as a result of legalization and regulation has 
become the main argument for many against that legalization and 
regulation.
Economists use the concept “elasticity” for measuring the e ect 
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of price change on demand. The price elasticity of the demand 
measures to what extent the demand responds to a certain price 
change. These changes are expressed in percentages in this relative 
context. For example: If the elasticity is -1, then this means that a 
price reduction of 1% will have increased the demand by 1%. If the 
elasticity (in absolute value) is lower than 1, then the demand will 
rise less than proportionally after a given reduction of the price. 
For example: if the elasticity is -0.5, then a price reduction of 1% 
will have increased the demand with only 0.5%. In the case of an 
elasticity that in absolute value is higher than 1, we have the op-
posite: the demand responds more than proportionally to a given 
price change.
So it is important to know the price elasticity of the demand 
for cannabis in order to be able to estimate what the e ect of the 
price reduction on the use of cannabis will be. A lot of research has 
been done that econometrically estimates the size of the price elas-
ticity of the demand for cannabis. I need to emphasize the fact that 
the estimation of the price elasticity of the demand for cannabis is 
very complex and can lead to large margins of error. The latter has 
especially to do with the bad quality of the data (both prices and 
consumption), which in turn is the result of the illegal character of 
the production and distribution of cannabis.
Summarizing, I can state, from these econometric studies, 
that the elasticity is situated between 0 and -1, with an average 
around -0.5. This means that the demand for cannabis really is sus-
ceptible to price changes, but this susceptibility remains relatively 
limited. A decrease in price of cannabis by 10% could raise the de-
mand for cannabis by approximately 5%. I should also emphasize 
that the elasticity can di er a lot depending on the type of user. 
The elasticity for a beginning user (initiation) is generally lower (in 
absolute value) than for a regular user.
Note in this respect that if we assume a price elasticity of -0.5, 
a decrease in price will decrease the expense of cannabis products 
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(expressed in euros). Expressed in another way: this means that a 
decrease in the price of cannabis will decrease the cannabis turn-
over (in euros). This reduces the cannabis market. This is also the 
main reason why cannabis production and distribution becomes 
less attractive for criminals after legalization and regulation.
The fact that a drop in price can stimulate (to a lesser degree) 
the consumption of cannabis, causes a demand for a price policy 
that has to be established by the regulating government. A gov-
ernment disposes of a series of instruments to limit the decrease 
in price after legalizing cannabis and thus diminishing the positive 
e ect on consumption or even eliminating it completely.
The state has two main instruments at its disposal to achieve 
this goal. The  rst instrument is that the government determines 
the cannabis prices. If in this case the objective is to prevent a price 
reduction, it has to impose a minimum price. The second instru-
ment is in uencing the prices by levying taxes on the production 
and/or use of cannabis.
A direct price policy by imposing minimum prices should be 
prevented. It was the technique formerly used by European author-
ities in many agricultural markets. There are some well-known 
disadvantages to this technique. A minimum price raises the prof-
itability of cannabis production and gives strong “incentives” to 
produce a lot. This way, an excess of supply is created that will 
probably  nd its way into illegal circulation.
It is advisable to pursue the price policy in an indirect way, in 
particular by levying taxes. This is also the approach followed by 
most governments in their price policy with regard to tobacco pro-
duction and consumption. A state can apply di erent techniques, 
for example:
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• a value-added tax, VAT (a  xed percentage on the sale price, 
for example 6 or 21 %);
• a  xed tax on a unit of weight (for example euros or dollars 
per gram); this is also called an excise;
• a  xed tax on the active content (for example a tax on the rel-
ative THC content per unit of weight; so THC percentage 
per gram);
• a progressive tax (by which the tax rate increases in accor-
dance with the potency of the product).
By levying such taxes, the government increases the price of 
the product and thus can completely or partially counteract the 
decrease in price that results from legalization and regulation.
The major advantage of taxes in comparison with imposing a 
minimum price is that the state prevents cannabis production from 
becoming extra pro table. As stated before, the latter occurs when 
establishing minimum prices. When a government imposes taxes, 
it actually makes sure that the extra pro t, which is made with a 
higher price, is pruned away and ends up in the budget.
The latter leads to the second major advantage of taxation. The 
regulation of the production and the distribution of cannabis, as I 
present in this book, assumes that the government sets free extra 
resources in order to regulate and control. A tax generates these 
resources and also makes it possible for the government to actually 
ful l this regulatory and controlling role. This is not possible when 
a government uses minimum prices as an instrument for the price 
policy.
5. Drug Policy as Part of a Social Policy 
Prevalence of cannabis consumption is often put on a par with 
prevalence of cannabis-related damage, but the majority of canna-
bis use is not problematic. Instead of narrowing down the outlook 
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to the reduction of use, a cannabis policy must try to reduce the 
total damage. The typical cannabis user is far from a criminal and 
most cannabis consumers are occasional, socially integrated and 
non-problematic users. If users do excessively use cannabis (abuse 
or dependence), then there is often a clear link with other personal, 
psychological, family or social problems. A drug policy that wants 
to have a meaningful impact on cannabis abuse (and drug abuse 
in general), has to be part of a much broader social policy. Apart from 
the regulation of cannabis, investments have to be made in order 
to improve health education, prevention and treatment and a deci-
sive policy concerning poverty, unemployment, social inequality, 
social exclusion and discrimination must be implemented. If we 
want to signi cantly tackle the wider challenges that are coupled 
with drugs, then legal regulation must go hand in hand with im-
provements with regard to the current forms of health education, 
prevention, treatment and recovery, and with the  ght against 
poverty, inequality and social exclusion.
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